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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays on Asset Pricing: A Model Comparison Perspective
by
Lingxiao Zhao
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Washington University in St. Louis, 2019
Professor Siddhartha Chib, Co-Chair
Professor Werner Ploberger, Co-Chair
In my dissertation, I focus on theoretical and empirical asset pricing from a Bayesian model com-
parison perspective.
In the first Chapter, revisiting the framework of Barillas and Shanken (2018), BS henceforth,
we show that the Bayesian marginal likelihood-based model comparison method in that paper is
unsound: the priors on the nuisance parameters across models must satisfy a change of variable
property for densities that is violated by the Jeffreys priors used in the BS method. Extensive
simulation exercises confirm that the BS method performs unsatisfactorily. We derive a new class
of improper priors on the nuisance parameters, starting from a single improper prior, which leads
to valid marginal likelihoods and model comparisons. The performance of our marginal likelihoods
is significantly better, allowing for reliable Bayesian work on which factors are risk factors in asset
pricing models.
In the second Chapter, starting from the twelve distinct risk factors in four well-established
asset pricing models, a pool we refer to as the winners, we construct and compare 4,095 asset
pricing models and find that the model with the risk factors, Mkt, SMB, MOM, ROE, MGMT, and
PEAD, performs the best in terms of Bayesian posterior probability, out-of-sample predictability,
and Sharpe ratio. A more extensive model comparison of 8,388,607 models, constructed from the
ix
twelve winners plus eleven principal components of anomalies unexplained by the winners, shows




On Comparing Asset Pricing Model
Siddhartha Chib, Xiaming Zeng, and Lingxiao Zhao1
In this paper we revisit the framework of Barillas and Shanken (2018), BS henceforth, and show
that the Bayesian marginal likelihood-based model comparison method in that paper is unsound.
In particular, we show that in this comparison of asset pricing models, in which the nuisance
parameters {η j} across models are connected by invertible mappings, the priors on the nuisance
parameters across models must satisfy a certain change of variable property for densities that is
violated by the off-the-shelf Jeffrey’ priors used in the BS method. Hence, the BS “marginal
likelihoods” each depend on an arbitrary constant, which voids the ranking of models by the size
of the marginal likelihoods and invalidates any conclusions drawn from such a method about the
underlying data-generating process (DGP). In the online appendix of their paper, BS discuss an
alternative method for calculating marginal likelihoods with their improper priors, which they call
the permutation method. This more involved method is not used in the paper but, as we show
below, it is also unsound and as a result leads to invalid marginal likelihoods.
1Siddhartha Chib (corresponding author, chib@wustl.edu) is at the Olin Business School, Washington University
in St. Louis. Xiaming Zeng is an Investment Professional. Lingxiao Zhao is at the Department of Economics,
Washington University in St. Louis. We are grateful to the Editor (Stefan Nagel) and two anonymous reviewers for
their constructive and helpful comments.
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We conduct extensive simulation exercises using two experiments. In the first, we match eight
potential risk factors to the excess market return (Mkt), size (SMB), value (HML), profitability
(RMW) and investment (CMA) factors proposed by Fama and French (1993, 2015), the profitabil-
ity (ROE) and investment (IA) factors in the q-factor model proposed by Hou, Xue, and Zhang
(2015), and the Carhart (1997) momentum (MOM) factor. In the second, we match twelve po-
tential risk factors to the eight factors above as well as the Asness and Frazzini (2013) quality
minus junk (QMJ) factor, the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity (LIQ) factor, the Frazzini and
Pedersen (2014) betting against beta (BAB) factor, and another version of value factor (HMLD)
proposed by Asness, Frazzini, and Pedersen (2019). Given the prejudged status of the Mkt factor
as a risk factor, we have 27 = 128 candidate models in the first experiment and 211 = 2,048 candi-
date models in the second. We repeat our comparison exercises over 100 simulated replications of
the data for sample sizes of 600, 1,200 and 12,000, 120,000 and 1.2 million for each of 30 (55) true
DGPs in the first (second) experiment. In the first experiment the BS method has some success
when the sample size is 1.2 million, but in the second experiment the BS method fails to locate any
of the true DGPs even once in 100 replications for any sample size, including the epic sample size
of 1.2 million.
In a significant advance, we derive a new class of improper priors on the nuisance parameters,
starting from a single improper prior, with the property that the improper priors in this class nec-
essarily share the same arbitrary constant c. This class of priors leads to valid marginal likelihoods
and, in turn, valid model comparisons. The construction of this class of improper priors is summa-
rized in Proposition 2 below. As we detail, the ability of the resulting marginal likelihoods to pick
the true DGPs is significantly better.
We also discuss an extension of our method to the more general class of model comparisons
in which the status of the Mkt factor as a risk factor is also in doubt. Chib and Zeng (2019) have
recently developed a method for conducting such comparisons that is based on proper priors, each
derived from a single proper prior, and student-t distributions of the factors. The approach in this
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paper, though closely related to that of Chib and Zeng (2019), requires fewer prior inputs, and
together pave the way for reliable Bayesian work on which factors are risk factors in asset pricing
models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we outline the BS method for cal-
culating marginal likelihoods. In Section II we discuss the issues that arise in calculating marginal
likelihoods with improper priors, and in Proposition 2 we provide a class of improper priors on
nuisance parameters that lead to valid marginal likelihoods. In Section III, we derive the priors
and marginal likelihoods that satisfy Proposition 2 (which we refer to as the Chib, Zeng, and Zhao
priors and marginal likelihoods) for the problem of comparing asset pricing models. Section IV
contains further critical discussion of the BS method, and Section V and VI present results from
extensive simulation experiments on the performance of the BS and Chib, Zeng, and Zhao meth-
ods, respectively. Section VII concludes. Appendices contain additional details relevant for the
discussion in the main text.
1.1 BS Method
In the method of BS, one starts with a collection of K (traded) potential risk factors. The market
factor (Mkt) is one of these K factors and is prejudged to be a risk factor. We will relax this
assumption in our method below. A particular asset pricing model arises by choosing one or more
of the remaining K−1 factors as risk factors. The model-space thus contains J = 2(K−1) models.
Let M j, j = 1,2, ...,J, represents any one of the possible models. It is defined by the vector of
risk factors {Mkt, f j} of size L j and the vector of non-risk factors f ∗j of size (K−L j). Note that
f is indexed by j because what goes into f is what varies across models. Then, letting t denote a
particular point in the sample, t = 1,2, ...,n, each model in the model-space is given by











+ ε∗j,t , ε∗j,t ∼NK−L j (0,Σ∗j),
where an intercept vector is absent from the f ∗j,t model because of the pricing restrictions and the
error terms ε j,t and ε∗j,t are assumed to be mutually independent and independently distributed
across t. Lowercase letters denote vectors and uppercase letters matrices (of dimensions that are
suppressed for convenience). Let β ∗j, f = vec(B
∗
j, f ) denote the column-vectorized form of B
∗
j, f , and
σ j = vech(Σ j) and σ∗j = vech(Σ
∗
j) the half or unique element vectorizations of the two covariance
matrices. Then the parameters of M j are




j, f ,σ j,σ
∗












are the nuisance parameters of M j. We let Θθ j and Θη j denote the parameter spaces of θ j and η j,
respectively, these being obvious by context.
BS suppose that the prior density of θ j is given by
pBS(θ j|M j) = πBS(α j|M j,η j)ψBS(η j|M j), (1.1.1)
where
πBS(α j|M j,η j) = NL−1(α j|0,kΣ j) (1.1.2)
ψBS(η j|M j) = |Σ j|−L j/2|Σ∗j |−(K−L j+1)/2 (1.1.3)
and k > 0 controls the spread of the prior on α j. Thus, in this prior πBS(α j|M j,η j) is a proper den-
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sity and ψBS(η j|M j) is an improper density (which comes from Jeffreys rule). The proportionality
sign of this improper density is replaced by equality because BS set the constant of proportionality
to one.
Under this prior, BS calculate the marginal likelihood of each of the J models. The marginal
likelihood is the integral of the sampling density (the likelihood function) with respect to the prior.
If we let
y1:T = ( f 1, f
∗
1, ..., f T , f
∗
T )
denote the sample data on the factors over T time periods, the marginal likelihood of M j is given
by the expression





p(y1:T |M j,θ j)π(α j|M j,η j)ψ(η j|M j)dθ j, (1.1.4)
which because of the independence of the errors and the independence of the priors, can be split
into two pieces as follows:
m(y1:T |M j) = m( f 1:T |M j)m( f ∗1:T |M j),
where each term on the right-hand side (RHS) is in closed form under the above assumptions. BS
take the log of m(y1:T |M j), j = 1, ...,J, to screen for the best model.
1.2 Marginal Likelihoods with Improper Priors
In general, improper priors invalidate Bayesian model comparisons by marginal likelihoods. An
improper prior is one whose integral over the parameter space is not finite. As a result, multiplying
an improper density by any arbitrary positive constant produces the same improper density. In other
words, because ψBS(η j|M j) is an improper distribution, c jψBS(η j|M j) is the same improper prior
5
for any c j > 0. This means that the marginal likelihood is indeterminate since it depends on an
arbitrary c j > 0.
Fixing c j at some value does not (in general) solve the problem because the resulting Bayes
factor depends on that choice. Thus, the choice of BS,
c j = 1 , j = 1,2, ...,J,
is not a panacea. In defense of this choice, in footnote 9 of their paper, BS make a reference
to nuisance parameters that are common across models. It is known that improper priors can be
used in the calculation of the marginal likelihood for parameters that are common across models
and that have the same support in each model. To see this, suppose that the nuisance parameters




j, f ,σ j,σ
∗
j) do not vary by model, and that their parameter spaces Θη are also
common across models. In that case,





p(y1:T |M j,θ j)π(α j|M j,η)cψ(η)dθ j. (1.2.1)
Thus, in comparing any two models, since the same constant c appears in the prior density of the
common nuisance parameters, the constant c cancels out. This simple argument is the basis of the
following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1. If the nuisance parameters are common across models and have the same
support in each model, then the collection of marginal likelihoods
{ m(y1:T |M1) , ..., m(y1:T |MJ)}
with a common improper prior on the common nuisance parameter are valid and comparable.
The setting of BS, however, does not correspond to this common parameter-common support
case because the nuisance parameters η j do, in fact, vary by model, and the parameter spaces on
6
which the improper prior is defined also vary by model. This can be easily seen from the model
formulation. In the BS method each nuisance parameter is given its own Jeffreys prior that has its
own constant (c j = 1), which renders the marginal likelihoods indeterminate.
For improper priors to work, the improper priors must be such that they necessarily share the
same constant across models. How can one make the different priors share the same constant





in this problem are connected by invertible maps. Chib and Zeng
(2019) exploit this feature to derive proper priors across models from a single proper prior. In the
current context with improper priors, we proceed as follows.
• We first derive the invertible map, as well as the Jacobian of the transformation, that connects
the nuisance parameters η1 of a model that we call M1, and the nuisance parameters η j of
a generic model that we refer to as M j.
• Next we give the nuisance parameters η1 of M1 a Jeffreys prior.
• Then, for every other model j > 1, we derive the prior on η j by a change of variable from
that single prior density.
The resulting improper prior densities then necessarily share the same constant, which means
that marginal likelihoods calculated with these priors are valid and comparable as that common
constant appears in each marginal likelihood and, hence, cancels out in taking ratios or log differ-
ences. This construction, which is new to the literature, is stated next.
PROPOSITION 2. Consider a collection of J models M1, ...,MJ . Suppose that the nuisance
parameters η1 of model M1 are connected to the nuisance parameters η j of M j ( j > 1) by the
invertible mapping η j = g j(η1), with the inverse mapping given by
η1 = g
−1




denote an arbitrary chosen improper prior on η1 in model M1 with an arbitrary constant c. Let





)∣∣∣∣∣ , j = 2,3, ...,J, (1.2.3)
denote the improper priors obtained by the change of variable formula from the first prior, where






p(y1:T |M1,θ 1)π(α1|M1,η1)cψ(η1|M1)dθ 1
and





p(y1:T |M j,θ j)π(α j|M j,η j)ψ̃(η j|M j)dθ j (1.2.4)
denote the marginal likelihoods of M1 and M j, j > 1, computed using cψ(η1|M1) and ψ̃(η j|M j),
respectively. Then the collection of marginal likelihoods
{m(y1:T |M1), m̃(y1:T |M2), ..., m̃(y1:T |MJ)}
are valid and comparable.
The proof of this proposition is straightforward. Inserting the definition of the improper prior
ψ̃(η j|M j) into m̃(y1:T |M j), we get












Since the same constant c appears in the RHS of each marginal likelihood in the collection, the
marginal likelihoods are comparable.
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It is worth noting that a reader of this paper argued that the priors in the BS collection are valid
because the nuisance parameters are connected by invertible maps. As proof of this claim, the
reader used a change-of-variable argument. This proof is incorrect, however, because the improper
priors in the BS collection do not take advantage of the invertible mapping, but the idea that the
change of variable property should play a role is relevant, though, as we have shown, the change
of variable property has to be enforced on the priors across models, as it is not an automatic
consequence of the invertible mapping between the nuisance parameters.
To emphasize the latter point, what Proposition 2 states is that the improper priors across
models have to be constructed from the prior of one model by the change of variable formula
for densities. Provided one follows this construction, the same constant c appears on the RHS of
each marginal likelihood. Any improper prior across models that is not constructed in this way
will violate the change of variable condition and hence necessarily entail an arbitrary constant,
rendering the marginal likelihood comparison void.
1.3 Improper Priors and Valid Marginal Likelihoods
We now derive the collection of improper priors that respect Proposition 2 and calculate the
marginal likelihoods with these priors. To derive the class of priors according to the construction
given in Proposition 2, we first derive the invertible map that connects the nuisance parameters
η1 of a model we call M1 and the nuisance parameters η j of a generic model that we refer to as
M j. We then derive the Jacobian of the transformation, followed by the prior density of η j by the
construction given in Proposition 2. We refer to the priors and marginal likelihoods that emerge
from our method as the Chib, Zeng, and Zhao (CZZ) priors and marginal likelihoods.
1.3.1 Derivation of the CZZ Priors






• M1 denotes the model in which all K factors are risk factors, following Chib and Zeng
(2019),
• M j, j = 2,3, ...,J−1, denotes the models in which {Mkt, f j} are the risk factors (i.e., f j is
nonempty), and
• MJ denotes the model in which {Mkt} is the only risk factor (i.e., f J is empty).
We now apply the construction given in Proposition 2. By definition, M1 is the model
f 1,t = α1 + β 1Mktt + ε1,t , ε1,t ∼NK−1 (0,Σ1) (1.3.1)
with f ∗1,t empty. Let σ1 = vech(Σ1). Then the nuisance parameters of M1 are given by
η1 = (β 1,σ1) .
Next, consider model M j, j = 2,3, ...,J−1, which we can write as










+ ε∗j,t , ε∗j,t ∼NK−L j (0,Σ∗j) (1.3.3)












Plugging the model in (1.3.2) into (1.3.3), we get
f ∗j,t = B
∗






























j, f β j




 Σ j Σ jB∗′j, f









Comparing the parameters of equations (1.3.1) and (1.3.5), we see that the nuisance parameters of







j, f β j
 (1.3.6)
Σ1 =
 Σ j Σ jB∗′j, f
























The set of vector equations in (1.3.6) and (1.3.8) constitute the inverse map η1 = g
−1
j (η j). The
determinant of the Jacobian of this transformation can now be derived. By derivations given in




)∣∣∣∣∣= |Σ j|K−L j .






Then, by the rule for the determinant of a partitioned matrix applied to (1.3.7), the prior of η j in
model M j, j = 2,3, ...,J−1, is
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Finally, consider model MJ , which can be written as







This model is just a special case of M j ( j 6= 1). It can be easily seen that the Jacobian is equal to
one, which implies that the prior of ηJ in model MJ is given by









We have thus proved the following new result.






where c is an arbitrary constant. Then the prior of η j in M j, j = 2,3, ..,J−1, given by





and that of ηJ in MJ given by
ψ̃(ηJ|MJ) = c|Σ∗J |−
K
2
satisfy Proposition 2 and lead to comparable marginal likelihoods.
The simplicity of this result should be noted.
1.3.2 CZZ Marginal Likelihoods
The valid marginal likelihoods for models M1, ...,MJ can now be derived. We assume that the
prior of α j|M j,η j is the same as in (1.1.2). These marginal likelihoods are in closed form for
every model in the model-space. As explained in Proposition 2, the constant c is arbitrary. In the
expressions below we set it to equal one. We use the identity of the marginal likelihood introduced
in Chib (1995) to simplify the computations of the marginal likelihoods. The calculations are
tedious but straightforward, and hence are suppressed.
Consider the typical model M j ( j 6= 1,J). The log marginal likelihood can be split into two
pieces (because of the independence of the errors and the independence of the priors) as follows:
log m̃(y1:T |M j) = log m̃( f j,1:T |M j) + log m̃( f ∗j,1:T |M j), (1.3.10)
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j, f f j,t)
′.
In these expressions the hat symbol denotes the least square estimates, and Γd(·) denotes the d-
dimensional multivariate gamma function. Finally, for M1 the log marginal likelihood is given by
(1.3.11), and for MJ it is given by (1.3.12).
The computations typically take a few seconds to scan our model-space of 2,048 models in the
twelve-factor case.
1.3.3 CZZ Marginal Likelihoods: General Case
We briefly note that our method can be extended in two directions: (1) to the more general class of
asset pricing model comparisons where the status of the Mkt factor as a risk factor is also in doubt,
as in the recent work of Chib and Zeng (2018) where marginal likelihoods are computed based on
proper priors and student-t distributions of the factors, and (2) to the case in which the intercept
14
term in the model of the risk factors is given a model-specific prior. This second extension is also
motivated by the work of Chib and Zeng (2018).
Let f̃ denote the set of risk factors, and let f ∗denote the set of non-risk factors. The model that
we describe here differs from those above because Mkt can now enter into f̃ or f ∗. Also note that
f̃ can never be empty, which means that the total number of models in the model-space is given by
J̃ = 2K−1. As above, suppose that in M1 all K factors are risk factors,
f̃ 1,t = α̃1 + ε̃1,t , ε̃1,t ∼NK (0,Σ1) . (1.3.13)
Let σ1 = vech(Σ1). Then the nuisance parameters of M1 are simply
η1 = σ1 .
In model M j, j = 2,3, ..., J̃, let f̃ j denote the risk factors with dimension L j× 1 and let f ∗j
denote the non-risk factors with dimension (K−L j)×1. This model is given by





f ∗j,t = B
∗



















where β ∗j, f = vec(B
∗




j). By calculations that we suppress, we
can prove the following result.





where c is an arbitrary constant. Then the priors of η j in M j, j = 2,3, .., J̃, given by





satisfy Proposition 2 and lead to comparable marginal likelihoods.
Next, instead of supposing that α̃ j has a NL j (0,kΣ j) prior in which the mean vector is zero,
and that the constant k is common across models, we suppose that α̃ j has the model-specific prior
α̃ j|M j ∼NL j (α̃ j0,k jΣ j) , j = 1,2, ..., J̃,
where the prior mean α̃ j0 and the multiplier k j are determined from a training sample (a sample of
data prior to the sample used for the model comparisons). In our applications, the training sample
consists of the first tr = 0.1 (tenth) of the data. If we let nt = tr×T denote the size of the this
training sample data, then




f̃ j,t , (1.3.16)
which is the average of the risk factors in the training sample data. To determine the model-specific
multiplier k j, we calculate Σ̂ j0, the least square estimate of Σ j in the training sample, and Vj0, the
negative inverse Hessian over α̃ j, from the log of the marginal likelihood of the training sample
observations f̃ 1:nt (conditioned on α̃ j but marginalized over Σ j):
log m̃( f̃ 1:nt |M j, α̃ j) = log
∫
p( f̃ 1:nt |M j, α̃ j,Σ j)π(Σ j|M j)dΣ j.
After omitting terms that do not involve α̃ j, the above expression can be written as
−
(








( f̃ j,t− α̃ j)( f̃ j,t− α̃ j)′
)
.
The Hessian matrix (a L j× L j matrix) of the latter function can be computed numerically. Our
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choice of k j is the average of the (element-by-element) ratio of the diagonal elements of Vj0 and
Σ̂ j0,










, j = 1,2, ..., J̃, (1.3.17)
where mult = 1−trtr is a multiplier that adjusts for the different sizes of the training and estima-
tion samples. We can now prove the following proposition about the marginal likelihoods for the
estimation sample.
PROPOSITION 5. Under the collection of priors in Proposition 4, with c set equal to one, and
α̃ j|M j ∼NL j (α̃ j0,k jΣ j), the marginal likelihood of model M j, j = 2,3, ..., J̃, on the log-scale is
given by
log m̃(ynt+1:T |M j) = log m̃( f̃ j,nt+1:T |M j) + log m̃( f
∗
j,nt+1:T |M j), (1.3.18)
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and the log marginal likelihood of M1 defined in (1.3.13) is given by (1.3.19). In these expressions,
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j, f f̃ j,t)
′.
As above, the hat symbol denotes the least square estimates, but now calculated using the data
beyond the training sample, and Γd(·) denotes the d-dimensional multivariate gamma function. We
emphasize that these marginal likelihoods correspond to the more general model comparison prob-
lem, where the status of the Mkt factor as a risk factor is also in doubt. Although we do not report
any results in this paper from applying Proposition 5, our experiments show that the model-specific
prior α̃ j|M j ∼NL j (α̃ j0,k jΣ j) produces performance gains of up to 20%, for smaller sample sizes,
compared to the marginal likelihoods of Proposition 5 based on α̃ j|M j ∼NL j (0,kΣ j). Thus, it is
our recommendation that future work using our method rely not only on the general model given
here but also on the model-specific prior defined by (1.3.16) and (1.3.17).
1.4 Further Comments about the BS Method
It is clear from our Proposition 3 that the off-the-shelf BS Jeffreys priors are different from the
priors dictated by Proposition 2, in particular, the BS method’s priors involve arbitrary constants
that do not cancel out in the calculation of the marginal likelihoods. The reason is that the BS
method uses separate Jeffreys priors that are unrelated to the across-models change of variable
formula that is used in the construction of Proposition 2. In fact, BS do not derive the general
mapping between pairs of models, nor do they derive the general form of the Jacobian of the
transformation. Without this information, the required collection of improper priors given in our
Proposition 3 cannot be constructed.
1.4.1 Example
Consider an example with three factors, say, the excess market return (Mkt), size (SMB), and
value (HML) factors. In this case, there are four possible pricing models that need to be compared
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simultaneously. Let us consider two of these four models.
In the first model, M1, suppose that all three factors {Mkt, HML SMB} are the risk factors.















































In the second model, M2, suppose that {Mkt,HML} are the risk factors. In this case, the factor





+ β2,hm︸ ︷︷ ︸
β2:1×1

















+ ε∗t , ε∗t ∼N (0, σ∗22,s︸︷︷︸
Σ∗2:1×1
), (1.4.5)
where the first subscript of the parameter indicates the model. The specification for SMB has no
intercept term due to the pricing restrictions. The set of nuisance parameters in this model is of
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The inverse mapping g−12 (·) in (1.2.2) can be derived by substituting the model of HML into
that of SMB in model M2 and comparing terms with those in model M1. By elementary algebra
we get






























We can now easily check that the BS prior of η2 in M2, given in (1.4.7) above, is not equal to


























Therefore, because ψBS(η2|M2) 6= ψ̃(η2|M2), Proposition 2 is violated.
1.4.2 Permutation Method
A reader of our paper argued that the method given by BS in the appendix of their paper is im-
mune to the flaw discussed above. This method, which is called the permutation method, is more
involved and is not used by BS in the analysis given in their paper. We show that, unfortunately,
the permutation method also involves arbitrary constants that do not cancel out.
Consider a three-factor world consisting of Mkt, SMB, and HML. Since Mkt is always a risk
factor, there are 2! = 2 possible permutations. In the first permutation the factors are ordered as
P1 = {Mkt, HML, SMB}, and in the second they are ordered as P2 = {Mkt, SMB, HML}. Under
P1, three nested models can be shown to arise by suitably restricting the parameters of the model
HMLt = a + bMktt + e (1.4.14)
SMBt = c + dMktt + gHMLt + u. (1.4.15)
For instance, the model M1|P1 (Mkt, HML, SMB are risk factors) arises by setting a 6= 0 and
c 6= 0, M2|P1 (Mkt, HML are risk factors) arises by setting a 6= 0 and c = 0, and M3|P1 (Mkt
is the only risk factor) arises by setting a = 0 and c = 0. Since these models are nested, they
share the same nuisance parameters. Proposition 1 applies and, for example, the constant c1 (here
the subscript 1 denotes the first permutation) can be carried through for the computation of the
marginal likelihoods of these models. Under P2, three nested models can be shown to arise by
suitably restricting the parameters of the model
SMBt = a′+ b′Mktt + e′ (1.4.16)
HMLt = c′+ d′Mktt + g′SMBt + u′. (1.4.17)
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For instance, the model M1|P2 (Mkt,SMB, HML are risk factors) arises by setting a′ 6= 0 and
c′ 6= 0, M2|P2 (Mkt, SMB are risk factors) arises by setting a′ 6= 0 and c = 0, and M3|P2 (Mkt
is the only risk factor) arises by setting a′ = 0 and c′ = 0. Again, in comparing these three models,
the constant c2 can be used in the improper prior because this situation corresponds to that of
Proposition 1. Notice also that M1|P1 and M1|P2 are the same model, as are M3|P1 and
M3|P2. Thus, according to Proposition 1, one can replace c2 with c1 in calculating the marginal
likelihoods of M1|P2 and M3|P2.
The problem arises in this method in comparing the two distinct models M2|P1 and M2|P2,
which lie in two different permutations, because these are not nested by the same model. We are
now in the situation corresponding to Proposition 2. The nuisance parameters of these models can
be linked, but as we know the Jeffreys prior for BS for the parameters in M2|P2 will not satisfy
the change of variable condition, which invalidates the marginal likelihood comparison. In other
words, the hidden constants c1 and c2, which are not relevant in comparing the models within
a given permutation, now do not cancel out, invalidating the comparison of models M2|P1 and
M2|P2. The problem gets worse as the number of factors increase. For example, with 12 factors,
there are 11! = 39,916,800 possible permutations and numerous models across those permutations
for which the BS priors across permutations violate the change of variable condition. Numerical
experiments confirm that, besides being numerically unwieldy, the permutation method suffers
from the same performance issues as the method used by BS in their paper. Thus, both methods,
the one used by BS in their paper and the one mentioned in their online appendix, are unsound and
cannot be used to find risk factors in asset pricing. To avoid duplication in our findings, however,
in the next section we maintain our focus on the method that is used by BS in their paper.
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1.5 Performance of BS Method
In their paper BS do not provide simulation evidence on the performance of their marginal likeli-
hoods to screen for the correct model. Rectifying this omission is the first order of business. We
construct two experiments that mimic real-world factors and situations, apply the BS method for
different true DGPs and sample sizes, and report on what we find. The first experiment involves
eight factors and a model-space of J = 128 models. This is a relatively small-scale problem that
should be easy to get right. In this case, we consider 33 DGPs to ensure that our results are not
specific to one particular DGP in the model-space. For each DGP, we run the experiment 100
times for several sample sizes, which go up to T = 1.2 million. We then record the percentage of
times (in those 100 replications) that the true DGP is selected by the BS marginal likelihood. The
second experiment follows the same approach for K = 12 factors and an associated model-space
of J = 2,048 models. In this setting, we consider 55 DGPs. For each of these 55 DGPs, we run
the experiment 100 times, calculating the marginal likelihood of each of the 2,048 models, and we
record the percentage of times the true DGP is selected. These experiments are again conducted
for different values of T , where start from T = 600 and go up to T = 1.2 million. We also subject
our new method to the same set of experiments.
1.5.1 Eight-Factor Experiment: J = 128
In our first experiment, we consider a problem with eight factors. Our simulations proceed as
follows. We match eight factors to the excess market return (Mkt), size (SMB), value (HML),
profitability (RMW), and investment (CMA) factors proposed by Fama and French (1993, 2015),
the profitability (ROE) and investment (IA) factors in the q-factor model proposed by Hou, Xue,
and Zhang (2015), and the Carhart (1997) momentum (MOM) factor. In this setting, there are
27 = 128 possible models depending on the assumption made about the collection of factors that
go into f t (the Mkt factor always being included as one of those factors). To ensure that the results
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do not depend on a particular DGP, we consider 33 different DGPs for generating the data. For
each DGP, we generate 100 replicated data sets. For each of these data sets, we calculate the BS
“marginal likelihoods” of the 128 candidate models to see if the true DGP is selected. We repeat
these steps for each of the 33 DGPs.
In Table 1.1 we report the percentage of times (in 100 replications of data for each true model)
that the true DGP is selected for sample sizes of size T = 600, 1,200, 12,000, 120,000, and
1,200,000 based on the “marginal likelihood” criterion of BS.
The true DGPs are listed by row, and following BS, the value of k in equation (1.1.2) is given
by
k = (Sh2max−Sh(Mkt)2)/7, (1.5.1)
where Sh(Mkt) is the Sharpe ratio of the simulated Mkt factor, Shmax = τ × Sh(Mkt), and τ is
set to 3. We have also tried other values of τ mentioned in BS: 1.25, 1.5, and 2. In each case
the associated selection percentages of these are no higher than those with τ = 3. The “marginal
likelihood” approach of BS does not select any of the 33 true models even once in 100 replications
for samples up to T = 12,000, which corresponds to a thousand years of data. The method has
some success in detecting a few DGPs for the two largest samples sizes, but this success pertains
to sample sizes that are unattainable in practice. One does not observe even this limited success in
the next set of experiments with twelve potential risk factors.
1.5.2 Twelve-Factor Experiment J = 2,048
The performance of the “marginal likelihood” method of BS worsens as the model-space is en-
larged. To illustrate this point, we provide extensive results from our second experiment with
twelve potential risk factors. The overall experiment and implementation are similar to those for
the eight-factor experiment.
We match our twelve factors to the eight factors in the first experiment, as well as the Asness
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This table reports the simulation results on the performance of the BS method with eight potential risk
factors. The model-space consists of J = 128 models. Each row represents a particular DGP for generating
the data. Numerical entries are the percentage of times the true DGP is selected among the 128 candidate
models in a repeated sampling experiment, for each of five different sample sizes (indicated by column)
and for each of 33 different DGPs (indicated by row). Following BS, k = (Sh2max−Sh(Mkt)2)/7, where Sh
refers to the sharp ratio and Shmax = 3×Sh(Mkt).
Barillas and Shanken (2018)
Risk factors in the true model T = T = T = T = T =
600 1,200 12,000 120,000 1,200,000
Mkt SMB RMW IA MOM 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt RMW IA MOM 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt IA MOM 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt HML ROE MOM 0 0 0 0 25
Mkt SMB RMW CMA MOM 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt RMW CMA MOM 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt CMA MOM 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt SMB HML RMW MOM 0 0 0 0 17
Mkt HML RMW MOM 0 0 0 0 17
Mkt SMB RMW MOM 0 0 0 36 92
Mkt RMW MOM 0 0 0 41 94
Mkt HML MOM 0 0 0 0 52
Mkt MOM 0 0 0 60 94
Mkt SMB ROE IA 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt ROE IA 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt SMB RMW IA 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt RMW IA 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt IA 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt SMB CMA ROE 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt CMA ROE 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt SMB HML ROE 0 0 0 0 32
Mkt HML ROE 0 0 0 0 38
Mkt SMB ROE 0 0 0 31 93
Mkt ROE 0 0 0 31 91
Mkt SMB RMW CMA 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt RMW CMA 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt CMA 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt SMB HML RMW 0 0 0 0 30
Mkt HML RMW 0 0 0 0 38
Mkt SMB RMW 0 0 0 42 92
Mkt RMW 0 0 0 43 96
Mkt HML 0 0 0 0 61
Mkt 0 0 0 60 97
Table 1.1
and Frazzini (2013) quality minus junk (QMJ) factor, the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity
(LIQ) factor, the Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) betting against beta (BAB) factor, and another
version of value factor (HMLD) proposed by Asness et al. (2019). We now have 211 = 2,048
possible models depending on the assumption made about the collection of factors that go into
f t . As in our first experiment, the parameters of the DGP are fixed at the maximum likelihood
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This table reports the simulation results on the performance of the BS method with twelve potential risk
factors. The model-space consists of J = 2,048 models.
Barillas and Shanken (2018)
Risk factors in the true model T = T = T = T = T =
600 1,200 12,000 120,000 1,200,000
Mkt SMB RMW IA MOM 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt RMW IA MOM 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt IA MOM 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt HML ROE MOM 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt SMB RMW CMA MOM 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt RMW CMA MOM 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt CMA MOM 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt SMB HML RMW MOM 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt HML RMW MOM 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt SMB RMW MOM 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt RMW MOM 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt HML MOM 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt MOM 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt SMB ROE IA 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt ROE IA 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt SMB RMW IA 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt RMW IA 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt IA 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt SMB CMA ROE 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt CMA ROE 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt SMB HML ROE 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt HML ROE 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt SMB ROE 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt ROE 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt SMB RMW CMA 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt RMW CMA 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt CMA 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt SMB HML RMW 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt HML RMW 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt SMB RMW 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt RMW 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt HML 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt QMJ 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt LIQ 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt BAB 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt HMLD 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt MOM QMJ 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt IA QMJ 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt QMJ HMLD 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt MOM QMJ HMLD 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt MOM QMJ LIQ 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt CMA MOM LIQ 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt IA MOM QMJ 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt CMA LIQ BAB 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt SMB HML RMW QMJ 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt RMW CMA MOM BAB 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt CMA ROE BAB HMLD 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt RMW QMJ BAB HMLD 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt RMW CMA MOM LIQ BAB 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt RMW ROE QMJ BAB HMLD 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt HML RMW IA MOM BAB HMLD 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt HML RMW IA MOM BAB HMLD 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt HML RMW IA MOM BAB HMLD 0 0 0 0 0
Mkt HML ROE IA LIQ BAB HMLD 0 0 0 0 0
Table 1.2
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(ML) values to ensure that the generated data resemble the real data. After checking the statistical
significance of the risk factors for each of the 2,048 possible models using methods described in
Appendix A, there are 567 models that are possible DGPs in this setting.
To conserve space, we do not report results for each of the 567 DGPs (this information is
available from us up on request). For each of the 567 DGPs, we generate 100 data sets for a total
of 56,700 data sets. For each of these data sets we calculate 2,048 “marginal likelihoods” using
the method of BS, one for each of the 2,048 possible models, and then record the percentage of
times the true DGP is selected. The results show that the BS method does not select the correct
model even once across the 567 DGPs for any sample size, including the sample size of 1.2 million.
Table 1.2 reports the results for 55 of the 567 DGPs, where 33 of these DGPs are the same as those
in the first experiment above, and 22 are with the new factors included in the current experiment.
1.6 Performance of the CZZ Method
For comparison, we replicate the above set of experiments using the same set of DGPs and the same
data sets, based on the CZZ marginal likelihood method. The results reported in Tables 1.3 and
1.4, for the eight-factor and twelve-factor experiments, respectively, show that the performance of
the CZZ method is significantly better even when confronted with meager sample sizes of T = 600
and 1,200. These results demonstrate clearly the performance gains from using the CZZ priors and
marginal likelihoods.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that the “marginal likelihood” approach of Barillas and Shanken (2018)
is unsound on account of its reliance on off-the-shelf Jeffreys improper priors on model-specific
nuisance parameters. These priors do not satisfy the required across-models change of variable
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This table reports the simulation performance of the CZZ method with eight potential risk factors. The
model-space consists of J = 128 models. Each row represents a particular DGP for generating the data.
Numerical entries are the percentage of times the true DGP is selected among the 128 candidate models in
a repeated sampling experiment, for each of five different sample sizes (indicated by column) and for each
of 33 different DGPs (indicated by row). Following BS, k = (Sh2max−Sh(Mkt)2)/7, where Sh refers to the
sharp ratio and Shmax = 3×Sh(Mkt).
CZZ method
Risk factors in the true model T = 600 T = 1,200 T = 12,000
Mkt SMB RMW IA MOM 62 80 91
Mkt RMW IA MOM 53 72 91
Mkt IA MOM 55 69 85
Mkt HML ROE MOM 45 65 91
Mkt SMB RMW CMA MOM 57 70 96
Mkt RMW CMA MOM 59 74 88
Mkt CMA MOM 51 76 86
Mkt SMB HML RMW MOM 54 75 96
Mkt HML RMW MOM 53 71 89
Mkt SMB RMW MOM 49 61 91
Mkt RMW MOM 49 68 88
Mkt HML MOM 54 70 87
Mkt MOM 51 68 83
Mkt SMB ROE IA 61 68 91
Mkt ROE IA 51 69 85
Mkt SMB RMW IA 61 74 90
Mkt RMW IA 57 69 87
Mkt IA 48 60 84
Mkt SMB CMA ROE 59 69 91
Mkt CMA ROE 51 69 84
Mkt SMB HML ROE 65 76 90
Mkt HML ROE 51 72 86
Mkt SMB ROE 56 75 93
Mkt ROE 49 71 84
Mkt SMB RMW CMA 50 66 92
Mkt RMW CMA 52 68 87
Mkt CMA 51 65 83
Mkt SMB HML RMW 51 69 90
Mkt HML RMW 46 69 84
Mkt SMB RMW 42 61 83
Mkt RMW 52 67 84
Mkt HML 54 66 83
Mkt 49 64 89
Table 1.3
formula, formulated in our Proposition 2, and hence depend on arbitrary constants that invalidate
the model comparison by marginal likelihoods.
In a notable advance, we derive a new class of improper priors on the nuisance parameters that
follow the construction given in Proposition 2 and hence lead to valid marginal likelihoods and
model comparisons. The empirical performance of our new marginal likelihoods is significantly
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This table reports the simulation performance of the CZZ method with twelve potential risk factors. The
model-space consists of J = 2,048 models.
CZZ method
Risk factors in the true model T = 600 T = 1,200 T = 12,000
Mkt SMB RMW IA MOM 36 47 79
Mkt RMW IA MOM 19 42 75
Mkt IA MOM 28 31 75
Mkt HML ROE MOM 17 34 74
Mkt SMB RMW CMA MOM 26 42 79
Mkt RMW CMA MOM 23 44 78
Mkt CMA MOM 29 39 75
Mkt SMB HML RMW MOM 21 39 81
Mkt HML RMW MOM 20 40 74
Mkt SMB RMW MOM 26 45 82
Mkt RMW MOM 31 38 79
Mkt HML MOM 35 42 73
Mkt MOM 29 38 71
Mkt SMB ROE IA 36 46 77
Mkt ROE IA 24 35 74
Mkt SMB RMW IA 33 43 78
Mkt RMW IA 25 38 75
Mkt IA 24 37 69
Mkt SMB CMA ROE 34 45 78
Mkt CMA ROE 27 35 71
Mkt SMB HML ROE 33 47 74
Mkt HML ROE 28 42 74
Mkt SMB ROE 32 41 84
Mkt ROE 27 40 73
Mkt SMB RMW CMA 28 47 76
Mkt RMW CMA 27 37 72
Mkt CMA 28 39 73
Mkt SMB HML RMW 24 40 78
Mkt HML RMW 27 40 76
Mkt SMB RMW 27 40 79
Mkt RMW 27 41 71
Mkt HML 22 46 74
Mkt 31 46 79
Mkt QMJ 27 38 77
Mkt LIQ 33 44 75
Mkt BAB 29 39 74
Mkt HMLD 25 33 72
Mkt MOM QMJ 30 41 75
Mkt IA QMJ 30 34 79
Mkt QMJ HMLD 30 37 73
Mkt MOM QMJ HMLD 30 43 75
Mkt MOM QMJ LIQ 26 51 85
Mkt CMA MOM LIQ 26 50 78
Mkt IA MOM QMJ 24 40 77
Mkt CMA LIQ BAB 19 47 82
Mkt SMB HML RMW QMJ 39 49 86
Mkt RMW CMA MOM BAB 23 45 81
Mkt CMA ROE BAB HMLD 19 45 79
Mkt RMW QMJ BAB HMLD 41 49 78
Mkt RMW CMA MOM LIQ BAB 25 43 82
Mkt RMW ROE QMJ BAB HMLD 46 55 87
Mkt HML RMW IA MOM BAB HMLD 42 57 82
Mkt HML RMW IA MOM BAB HMLD 43 50 86
Mkt HML RMW IA MOM BAB HMLD 39 62 87
Mkt HML ROE IA LIQ BAB HMLD 37 57 82
Table 1.4
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Winners from Winners: A Tale of Risk
Factors
Siddhartha Chib1, Dashan Huang2, Lingxiao Zhao3, Guofu Zhou4
2.1 Introduction
The question of which risk factors best explain the cross-section of expected equity returns contin-
ues to draw attention on account of the large importance of this topic for theoretical and empirical
finance (Cochrane, 2011). Along with the market factor, hundreds of additional risk factors have
emerged (Harvey, Liu, and Zhu, 2016, Hou, Xue, and Zhang, 2017), and the set of possible such
factors continues to grow. Rather than add to this list, we ask a straightforward question: could
we start with the risk factor collections that have generated support in the recent literature, take
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lingxiao@wustl.edu.
4Olin School of Business, Washington University in St. Louis, 1 Bookings Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130. e-mail:
zhou@wustl.edu
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the union of the factors in those collections as the pool of winners, and then find a new set of risk
factors (winners from winners) that gather even more support from the data, on both statistical and
financial grounds?
To answer this question, in what we call the tale of risk factors, we consider the four risk factor
collections that we believe have spawned consensus support within the profession, namely those in
the papers by Fama and French (1993, 2015, 2018), Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015), Stambaugh and
Yuan (2017), and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Sun (2020). These collections, which cover the market,
fundamental and behavioral factors, listed by author initials and risk factor abbreviations, are as
follows5:
• FF6 collection: {Mkt, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA, MOM};
• HXZ collection: {Mkt, SMB, IA, ROE};
• SY collection: {Mkt, SMB, MGMT, PERF};
• DHS collection: {Mkt, PEAD, FIN}
In the first part of the analysis, the winners model scan, we focus on the set of these winners,
and ask what collection of winners from winners emerge when each factor is allowed to play
the role of a risk factor, or a non-risk factor, to produce different groupings of risk factors in a
combinatorial fashion. Each grouping consists of a collection of factors that are risk factors in that
grouping, and a complementary collection (the remaining factors) that are not risk factors in that
grouping. We compare the resulting set of 4,095 asset pricing models, each of which is internally
consistent with its assumptions of the risk factors, from a Bayesian model comparison perspective
(Avramov and Chao, 2006, Barillas and Shanken, 2018, Chib and Zeng, 2019, Chib, Zeng, and
Zhao, 2020).
Our first main result, from the winners model scan, is that a six-factor model, consisting of
Mkt, SMB, MOM, ROE, MGMT, and PEAD from the twelve factors, gets the most support from
5There are slight differences in these collections in relation to the size factor, which we ignore for simplicity.
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the data. This model is closely followed by a second model, a seven-factor model that has PERF as
an additional risk factor, and a third model, a five-factor model, that does not have MOM as a risk
factor. In terms of probabilities, these models have posterior model probabilities of around 0.13,
0.11, 0.10, respectively. Though one would have liked to witness even more decisive posterior sup-
port for the best model, this is unrealistic on a large model space composed of models constructed
from factors that are a prior winners. Nevertheless, the data evidence is clear in isolating the win-
ners from winners as the posterior probability distribution beyond the top three slumps sharply.
For example, the posterior probabilities of the fourth and fifth-best models are around 0.03, and
the sixth is about 0.025. The posterior probabilities of the remaining models in the model space
barely register, being roughly of the same size as the prior probability of 1/4,095 = 0.00025, and
even below.
Interestingly, models with the same risk factor set as FF6, HXZ, SY, and DHS do not appear in
the top model set. As we demonstrate later, this relative under performance stems from a failure to
clear an internal consistency condition. We say the risk factor set of a particular model satisfies an
internal consistency condition if its risk factors can price the set of non risk factors in that model
without incurring a penalty. In other words, a penalty is incurred, and the marginal likelihood
suffers if the constraint that the intercepts in the conditional model of the non risk factors, which
by the assumption must be all zero, is binding. If the constraints are not binding, then its marginal
likelihood is significantly higher. Empirically, we find that the FF6, HXZ, SY, and DHS risk factor
sets fail this internal consistency condition, while the risk factor sets of our three top factor models
pass it.
We also document the performance of top models on other important statistical and economic
dimensions. For one, we examine the performance of the top models in forecasting out-of-sample.
Also, we compare the Sharpe ratios of the mean-variance portfolio constructed from the risk factors
of the top models, and the Sharpe ratios of the portfolios from the risk factors in the FF6, HXZ,
SY, and DHS collections. We find that the top models perform well in all comparisons.
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In the second part of our analysis, in what we call the winners plus genuine anomalies model
scan, we consider a more extensive model comparison of 8,388,607 asset pricing models, con-
structed from the twelve winners plus eleven principal components of anomalies unexplained by
the winners, the genuine anomalies. The general question is to see if one can get an improved set
of risk factors by considering models that involve the set of winners and additional factors based on
the genuine anomalies, i.e., anomalies that cannot be explained by the winners. We show that from
the set of 125 anomalies in Green, Hand, and Zhang (2017) and Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2017),
only twenty anomalies cannot be explained by the winners. These constitute the set of genuine
anomalies. For our winners plus anomalies model scan, we construct our different asset pricing
models from the twelve winners and the first eleven principal components (PCs) of the genuine
anomalies. In other words, each of the twelve winners, and each of the eleven PC’s, is allowed to
play the role of a risk-factor or a non-risk factor, leading to a model space of 223−1 possible asset
pricing models that we compare by using our Bayesian model comparison technique.
In this analysis, our tactic of reducing the 125 anomalies to the set of twenty genuine anoma-
lies can be viewed as a dimension-reduction strategy. Furthermore, our idea of converting these
anomalies to the space of principal components, is another element of the same strategy. Little
is lost (and much is gained) by converting the genuine anomalies to PCs since, in either case, the
genuine anomalies, or PCs, are portfolios of assets. What is important, however, is that we retain
the identity of our winners, thus allowing us to understand whether the PC factors provide incre-
mental information for pricing assets. And if so, whether the winners from the winners model scan
continue to be risk factors in this broader space of models.
Our second main result, from the winners plus genuine anomalies scan, shows that there is
much to gain by incorporating information in the genuine anomalies. For example, the Sharp
ratios increase by more than 30%, which shows the benefit of incorporating information in genuine
anomalies in explaining the cross-section of expected equity returns. Nonetheless, the risk factors
from the winners set are the key risk factors, even though some prove to be redundant.
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Our paper is part of a new wave of Bayesian approaches to risk factor selection. For instance,
Kozak, Nagel, and Santosh (2020) focus on PC factors that are constructed from well-known
factors and anomaly factors, and utilize interesting economic priors to isolate the relevant PCs
in a classical penalized regression estimation. In contrast to their study, we retain the identity of
the winners and construct PCs only from the genuine anomalies and approach the estimation from
a fully Bayesian perspective. Bryzgalova, Huang, and Julliard (2019) is also part of this new wave
of Bayesian work which delivers, for each factor, the marginal posterior probability that that factor
is a risk factor, while our approach is concerned with the question of which collection of factors
are jointly risk factors.
This paper adds broadly to the recent Bayesian literature in finance, for example, Pástor (2000),
Pástor and Stambaugh (2000), Pástor and Stambaugh (2001), Avramov (2002), Ang and Timmer-
mann (2012), and Goyal, He, and Huh (2018).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly outline the methodology
that we use to conduct our model comparisons. In Section 3, we consider the winners model scan,
and in Section 4 the winners plus genuine anomalies model scan. Section 5 and Section 6 contain
results and Section 7 concludes.
2.2 Methodology
Suppose that the potential risk factor set is denoted by f t : K×1, where t denotes the t-th month.
We now allow each factor to play the role of a risk factor (i.e., an element of the stochastic dis-
count factor), or a non-risk factor, to produce different groupings of risk factors in a combinatorial
fashion. Starting with K initial possible risk factors, there are, therefore, J = 2K− 1 possible risk
factor combinations (assuming that the risk-factor set cannot be empty). Each of these risk factor
combinations defines a particular asset pricing model M j, j = 1, ...,J.
Consider now a specific model M j, j = 1, ...,J consisting of the risk factors x j,t : kx, j×1, and
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the complementary set of factors (the non risk factors) w j,t : kx, j× 1, where K = kx, j + kw, j. By
definition, factors are risk factors if they are in the stochastic discount factor M j,t . Following
Hansen and Jagannathan (1991), we specify the SDF as
M j,t = 1−λ ′x, jΩ−1x, j
(
x j,t−E[x j,t ]
)
, (2.2.1)
where bx, j , Ω−1x, j λ x, j : kx, j× 1 are the unknown risk factor loadings, and Ωx, j : kx, j× kx, j is the
covariance matrix of x j. Enforcing the pricing restrictions implied by the no-arbitrage condition
E[M j,tx′j,t ] = 0 and E[M j,tw′j,t ] = 0
for all t, we get that E[x j,t ] = λ x, j, and E[w j,t ] = Γ jλ x, j, for some matrix Γ j : kw, j× kx, j. If we
assume that the joint distribution of (x j,w j) is Gaussian, then the latter pricing restrictions imply
that under a marginal-conditional decomposition of the factors, M j has the restricted reduced form
given by
x j,t = λ x, j + εx, j,t , (2.2.2)
w j,t = Γ jx j,t + εw·x, j,t , (2.2.3)









and Ωw·x, j : kw, j× kw, j is the covariance matrix of the conditional residuals εw·x, j,t .
The goal of the analysis is to calculate the support for these models, M j, j = 1, ...,J, given the
sample data on the factors. To explain how this is done, we start with the prior distributions of the
36
parameters across models.
The parameters of model M j are given by
θ j , (λ x, j,η j),
where λ x, j are the risk premia parameters, and η j = (Γ j,Ωx, j,Ωw·x, j) are nuisance parameters.
Note the key point that the dimension of these nuisance parameters equals
{kw, jkx, j + kx, j(kx, j + 1)/2 + kw, j(kw, j + 1)/2}
= {k2x, j + k2w, j + 2kx, jkw, j + (kx, j + kw, j)}/2
= (K2 + K)/2,
which is the same across models. Chib and Zeng (2019) exploit this fact to develop proper priors,
and Chib, Zeng, and Zhao (2020) to develop improper priors, of η j, j = 1,2, ...,J, from a single
prior distribution.
Let M1 denote the model in which all K potential risk factors are risk factors. Then, η1 just




By derivations given in Chib, Zeng, and Zhao (2020), we get that the priors of η j, j > 1 are




2 , j > 1, (2.2.6)
where c is an arbitrary constant that by construction is the same across these priors, and, hence,
irrelevant in the comparison of models.
Finally, complete the prior distributions by supposing that, conditional on η j, the priors of λ x, j
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are the multivariate normal distributions
λ x, j|M j,η j ∼Nkx, j (λ x, j,0,κ jΩx, j),
where λ x, j,0 and κ j are model-specific hyperparameters that are determined from a training sample.
2.2.1 Marginal Likelihoods
Assume that each model M j ∈M has a prior model probability of Pr(M j) of being the correct
model. The objective is to calculate the posterior model probability Pr(M j|y1:T ), where y1:T =
( f 1, ..., f T ) is the estimation sample of the potential risk factors.
The key quantities for performing this prior-posterior update for the models in M are the
marginal likelihoods, defined as
m j(y1:T |M j) =
∫
Θ j
p(y1:T |M j,θ j)π(λ x, j|M j,η j)ψ(η j|M j)dθ j,
where Θ j is the domain of θ j,




Nkx, j (x j,t |λ x, j,Ωx, j)Nkw, j (w j,t |Γ jx j,t ,Ωw·x, j)
is the density of the data and Nd(·|µ,Ω) is the d-dimensional multivariate normal density function
with mean µ and covariance matrix Ω.
Notice that the phrase marginal likelihood encapsulates two concepts: one that it is a function
that is marginalized over the parameters of model j, hence the word marginal; and second that it is
the likelihood of the model parameter M j, hence the word likelihood.
Under our assumptions, the log marginal likelihoods are in closed form. Specifically,
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(w j,t− Γ̂ jx j,t)(w j,t− Γ̂ jx j,t)′.
Note that the variables in hat in the above expressions are the least squares estimates calculated
using the estimation sample, and Γd(·) denotes the d dimensional multivariate gamma function.
2.2.2 Model Scan Approach
We conduct a prior-posterior analysis on the model space denoted by M = {M1,M2, . . . ,MJ}.
Assume that each model in the model space is given an uninformative and equalized prior model
probability, that is, for any j
Pr(M j) = 1/J. (2.2.7)
Applying Bayes theorem to the unknown model parameter M j, the posterior model probability is
given by
Pr(M j|y1:T ) =






as the model prior probabilities in the numerator and the denominator cancel out.
Both the prior and posterior probability distributions on model space acknowledge the notion of
model uncertainty. The prior distribution on model space represents our beliefs about the models
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before we see the data. A discrete uniform prior is our default, but, of course, it is possible to
consider other prior distributions. The posterior distribution retains model uncertainty unless the
sample size is large in relation to the dimension of the model space. By this we mean that the
posterior distribution on model space will not concentrate on a single model. As T becomes
large, however, the asymptotic theory of the marginal likelihood (see, e.g., Chib, Shin, and Simoni
(2018)), implies that the posterior model probabilities will concentrate on the true model (if it is
in the set of models), or on the model that is closest to the true model in the Kullback-Leibler
distance.
Regardless of the sample size, however, the end-product of our analysis is a ranking of models
by posterior model probabilities (equivalently, by marginal likelihoods given that the denominator
in the posterior probability calculation is just a normalization constant). We indicate these ranked
models by
{M1∗,M2∗, . . . ,MJ∗}
such that
m1∗(y1:T |M1∗) > m2∗(y1:T |M2∗) > · · ·> mJ∗(y1:T |MJ∗).
This ranking provides the basis for our empirical Bayesian model comparison.
2.3 Winners Model Scan
As mentioned in the introduction, our first analysis is based on twelve factors from the studies
of Fama and French (1993, 2015, 2018), Stambaugh and Yuan (2017), and Daniel, Hirshleifer,
and Sun (2020). Details of these factors, {Mkt, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA, MOM, IA, ROE,
MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN}, are given in Table 2.1. While Mkt captures the overall market risk,
SMB, HML, RMW, CMA, MOM, IA, and ROE are well-known characteristic-based factors and
are constructed by sorting stocks in a relatively simple way. For those remaining novel four mis-
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pricing factors, MGMT and PERF are constructed based on average rankings of eleven anomalies
of stocks, and PEAD and FIN are related to investors’ psychology. Although the construction
and motivation of those factors are different, those twelve factors are named “winners” as they
are believed and proved to have strong power in explaining the cross-section of expected equity
returns.
The data on these winners are monthly, spanning the period from January 1974 to December
2018, for a total of 540 starting observations. Of these the last 12 months of data are held-out for
out-of-sample prediction validation purpose. For the other 528 in-sample monthly observations,
the first 10 percent is used as a training sample to construct the prior distributions of the risk premia
parameters, leaving a sample size of T = 475 as estimation sample.
2.3.1 Two special cases
To understand how the framework is applied, consider first the model in which all twelve winners
are risk factors. In this case, model M1 (say), the general model reduces to
x1,t = λ x,1︸︷︷︸
12×1
+εx,1,t , εx,1,t ∼N12(0,Ωx,1), (2.3.1)
where x1,t = (Mkt,SMB,SML,RMW,CMA,MOM, IA,ROE,MGMT,PERF,PEAD,FIN)′t and, since
the non-risk factor collection w1,t is empty, kx,1 = 12 and Ωx,1 : 12×12.
Now consider M2 (say) with the FF6 risk factors x2,t = (Mkt,SMB,SML,RMW,CMA,MOM)′t .
Then, we have
x2,t = λ x,2︸︷︷︸
6×1
+εx,2,t , εx,2,t ∼N6(0,Ωx,2),
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while for w2,t = (IA,ROE,MGMT,PERF,PEAD,FIN)′t we have
w2,t = Γ2︸︷︷︸
6×6
x2,t + εw·x,2, t , εw·x,2, t ∼N6(0,Ωw·x,2),
where kx,2 = 6, kw,2 = 6, Ωx,2 : 6× 6, and Ωw·x,2 : 6× 6. The latter model embodies the pricing
restrictions that the assumed risk factors of this model price the non-risk factors w2,t .
There are J = 4,095 such models in the model space M . Our goal is to compare these J models
using the model scan approach described in Section 2.
2.3.2 Winners Model Scan Results
Top Model Set
To get a clear picture of the prior-posterior update on the model space M , we view each model
as a point in that space. The prior distribution of models on that space is uniform. The posterior
probabilities of the models are proportional to the product of the uniform prior and the marginal
likelihoods. We can use these posterior probabilities to plot these points (or models) in that space
in decreasing order. From Figure 2.1, which plots the posterior model probability of the top 220
models. We can see from the figure that the posterior model probabilities drop sharply beyond the
top three models. For example, the posterior probabilities of the fourth and fifth-best models are
around 0.03, and the sixth is about 0.025. The posterior probabilities of the remaining models in
the model space barely register, being roughly of the same size as the prior probability of 1/4,095
= 0.00025, and even below.
In Figure 2.2 we plot these posterior model probabilities but, this time, only for the top 5
models. We see that the top three models have a joint posterior probability of 0.3407. In a sense,
we can think of these models as being indistinguishable, or equivalent. To make this more precise,
in the notation introduction above, let M1∗ denote the highest posterior probability model. If we
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now let the Bayes factor of the best model against any other model be denoted by
B1 j =
m1∗(y1:T |M1∗)
m j∗(y1:T |M j∗)
,
then, according to Jeffreys’ scale, if B1 j ≤ 10
1
2 , the evidence supporting M1∗ over M j∗ is barely
worth mentioning. Equivalently, in terms of the log Bayes factor, the indistinguishably condition
above can be expressed as
log B1 j = log m1∗(y1:T |M1∗)− log m j∗(y1:T |M j∗)≤ 1.15.
We can, therefore, refer to M j∗ that is in the radius of the best model in this way as being indistin-
guishable from the best model.
Applying this criterion, we conclude that M1∗, M2∗, and M3∗ constitute the top model set M∗
in the winners scan, while M4∗ and M5∗ also given in Figure 2.2 are not in the top model set.
Table 2.2 shows that the six-factor model M1∗ consisting of Mkt, SMB, MOM, ROE, MGMT,
and PEAD as risk factors gets the most support from the data. This model is closely followed by
the seven-factor model M2∗ that has PERF as an additional risk factor, and the five-factor model
M3∗ that does not have MOM as a risk factor.
Interestingly, Mkt, SMB, ROE, MGMT, and PEAD, are present in each of the three top group-
ings. It appears that both fundamental and behavioral factors play an important role in pricing the
cross-section of expected equity returns. It should also be noted that the top groupings feature
between five and seven-factors, similar to the number of factors in most of the literature.
Besides, the ratio of the posterior model probability and the prior model probability of any
given model M j, denoted by
Pr(y1:T |M j∗)
Pr(M j∗) , is provided in Table 2.2. That ratio reflects the informa-
tion improvement of posterior over the same prior for M j when data are observed. Therefore it is
a good measure for evaluating the joint superiority of candidate models. For comparison, Panel
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B of Table 2.2 reports the marginal likelihoods and that ratios for M1 and models with the same
risk factor sets as CAPM, Fama and French family, HXZ, SY, and DHS. It can seen that the in-
formation improvement of each of those models is substantially smaller than that of top models.
Because M1 is also not supported by the data, we can conclude that the twelve factors together
contain information redundancies.
Parameter Updating for the Best Model of the Winners Model Scan
































+ εw·x,1∗, t , εw·x,1∗, t ∼N6(0,Ωw·x,1∗).
In calculating the marginal likelihood of this model, which equals 14186.43, as reported earlier in






and the proper prior of the risk premia parameters λ x,1∗ from the training sample equal to
π(λ x ,1∗|M1∗,η1∗) = N6(λ x ,1∗|λ x,1∗,0,0.1915×Ωx,1∗),
where λ x,1∗,0 = (0.0017,0.0130,0.0044,0.0041,0.0084,0.0085)′.
Under our prior distributions, it is easy to confirm that the posterior distributions π(θ j|M j,y1:T )
of parameters θ j of any given model M j have the marginal-conditional forms given by
π(Ωx, j|M j,y1:T ) = W −1kx, j (Ωx, j|Ψ j,T + kx, j−K), (2.3.2)
π(λ x, j|M j,y1:T ,Ωx, j) = Nkx, j (λ x, j|λ x j1,
(




π(Ωw·x, j|M j,y1:T ) = W −1kw, j (Ωw·x, j|Ψ
∗
j ,T ), (2.3.4)
π(vec(Γ j)|M j,y1:T ,Ωw·x, j) = Nkw, j×kx, j (vec(Γ j)|vec(Γ̂ j),W
∗−1
j ⊗Ωw·x, j), (2.3.5)
where λ x, j,1 = 1T κ j+1λ x, j,0 +
T κ j
T κ j+1
λ̂ x, j and W −1(Ψ,ν) denotes the inverse Wishart distribution
with ν degrees of freedom and scale matrix Ψ. Thus, the posterior distribution π(θ j|M j,y1:T ) is
given by the product of equations (2.3.2), (2.3.3), (2.3.4), and (2.3.5). We can apply this result to
generate a large number of simulated draws, first by sampling the marginal distribution, and then by
the conditional distribution given the draws from the marginal distributions. These sampled draws
can be used to make marginal posterior distributions of relevant parameters, and other summaries.
Applying the above sampling procedure to M1∗, we obtain the marginal posterior distributions
of the risk premia parameters λ x,1∗ , given in Figure 2.3, and the posterior means, standard devia-
tions and quantiles, given in Table 2.3. It is interesting that the posterior means of the risk premia
parameters are similar, except for that of SMB, while the posterior standard deviations of the risk
premia of Mkt and MOM are almost twice as large as the rest.
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2.3.3 Why do FF6, HXZ, SY, and DHS not win?
It is crucial and meaningful to understand why models with the same risk factor set as FF6, HXZ,
SY, and DHS do not appear in the top model set. The reason for this is interesting. Essentially,
those models do not satisfy an internal consistency condition. We say that a particular model
satisfies the internal consistency condition if its risk factors can price the set of non risk factors
in that model without incurring a penalty. In other words, a penalty is incurred, and the marginal
likelihood suffers if the constraint that the intercepts in the conditional model of the non risk
factors, which by assumption must be all zero, is binding. If the constraints are not binding, then
its marginal likelihood is significantly higher.
Consider model M j
x j,t = λ x, j + εx, j,t ,
w j,t = Γ jx j,t + εw·x, j,t ,
with risk factors x j,t and non risk factors w j,t = (w j,1,t , . . . ,w j,kw, j,t)
′ with dimension kw, j×1. Now
for each non risk factor w j,i,t , i = 1,2, . . . ,kw, j, we compare the two models,
Mij,0 : w j,i,t = γ ′j,ix j,t + ε j,i,t (2.3.6)
and
Mij,1 : w j,i,t = α j,i + γ ′j,ix j,t + ε j,i,t (2.3.7)
using marginal likelihoods. If the log marginal likelihood of the second model does not exceed that
of the first model by more than 1.15, then, by an application of Jeffreys’ rule, we can conclude that
imposing the zero α j,i pricing restriction does not result in a marginal likelihood penalty. Stated
yet another way, this means that the non risk factor w j,i can be priced by the risk factor set x j of
that model M j. If this condition holds for each of the factors in w j, we conclude that the risk factor
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set of that model satisfies the ICC condition.
Our analysis shows that models with the same risk factor sets as CAPM, Fama and French
family, HXZ, SY, and DHS do not satisfy ICC. Specifically, the single Mkt factor cannot explain
the remaining 11 non risk factors. The risk factor sets of the Fama and French family models can
explain at most one non risk factor (IA). The risk factor set of HXZ can explain all of the Fama and
French factors, but cannot explain MGMT and PEAD. The risk factor sets of SY and DHS models
cannot explain one non risk factor, PEAD and MGMT, respectively. In contrast, the top models
in M∗ satisfy the ICC condition fully, which helps to explain why those models rank high in the
winners model scan.
2.3.4 Prediction
It is worthwhile to consider how well the top models perform out-of-sample. From the Bayesian
perspective, an elegant way to examine this question is by calculating the predictive likelihood
for a set of future observations. This predictive likelihood, which like the marginal likelihood, is
a number when evaluated at a particular sample of future observations, can be used to rank the
predictive performance of each model in the model space.
To define the predictive likelihood, let π(θ j|M j,y1:T ) denote the posterior distributions of the
parameters θ j of M j, and let y(T +1):(T +12) = ( f T +1, ..., f T +12) denote 12 months of held-out out-









p(y(T +1):(T +12)|M j,θ j)π(θ j|M j,y1:T )dθ j,
where




Nkx, j (x j,T +s|λ x, j,Ωx, j)Nkw, j (w j,T +s|Γ jx j,T +s,Ωw·x, j)
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is the out-of-sample density of the factors given the parameters. We can compute this integral by
Monte Carlo. Taking draws {θ (1)j , ...,θ
(G)
j } from π(θ j|M j,y1:T ), with G being a large integer, we
calculate the predictive likelihood as the Monte Carlo average
m j
(








p(y(T +1):(T +12)|M j,θ
(g)
j ).
Table 2.4 reports the log predictive likelihoods of the top three models as well as those com-
peting models. We can see that the top three models also have larger predictive likelihoods, which
means that they outperform the competing models on the predictive dimension.
2.4 Winners Plus Genuine Anomalies Model Scan
We now show that there are some benefits to including additional potential risk factors along with
the winners. There are many additional risk factors to draw upon and the approach we describe
can be used with any set of additional potential risk factors. For our analysis here we focus on the
125 anomalies in Green et al. (2017) and Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2017). These anomalies, which
are re-balanced at an annual or quarterly frequency, exclude anomalies that are re-balanced at a
monthly frequency, because the latter cease to be anomalies once transaction costs are taken into
account (Novy-Marx and Velikov, 2016, Patton and Weller, 2020). All these portfolios are value-
weighted and held for one month. Just as in the case of the winners, we have monthly observations
on these anomalies spanning the period from January 1974 to December 2018, for a total of 540
observations. We partition these observations into out-of-sample and in-sample, which consists of
the training sample and the estimation sample, just as in Section 3.
What we aim to show is that whether there is information in these anomalies that can be
captured to produce better statistical performance (in terms of marginal likelihoods) and higher
Sharpe-ratios of portfolios built from the best fitting risk-factors. In order to show this, we rec-
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ognize that the winners are already carefully vetted factors and, therefore, the anomalies that are
allowed to enter the pool of augmented potential risk factors must be those that cannot be priced by
these winners. This point helps to limit the dimension of the model space and allows us to design
a full model scan approach, as we now detail.
2.4.1 Genuine Anomalies
The model space with all 125 anomalies is 2137, which is astronomically large. However, it is
unnecessary to consider such a large model space because many of the anomalies can actually be
priced by the winners. In fact, Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2016) and Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2017) have
cast doubt on the credibility of these anomalies and Cochrane (2011) has raised similar concerns.
The first step, therefore, is to eliminate anomalies that are not genuine anomalies. An anomaly
is a genuine anomaly if it cannot be priced by the winners. Here is how we sort this issue out.
Let zi, i = 1,2, . . . ,125, denote the anomalies. Let x = (Mkt, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA, MOM,
IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN) denote the twelve winners. Now for each anomaly zi as the
response, and x as the covariates, we estimate two models, one without an intercept and one with:
Mi0 : zi,t = γ ′i xt + εi,t , εi,t
i.i.d.∼ N (0,σ2i ) (2.4.1)
and
Mi1 : zi,t = αi + γ ′i xt + εi,t εi,t
i.i.d.∼ N (0,σ2i ). (2.4.2)
In estimating these models, the first 10 percent of the data are used as a training sample to
pin down the hyperparameters of the proper prior distributions. We then use standard Bayesian
Markov chain Monte Carlo methods to estimate model on the remaining 90 percent of the data,
y1:T . The log marginal likelihood of each model is computed by the Chib (1995) method. Denote
these marginal likelihoods by log mi0(y1:T |Mi0) and log mi1(y1:T |Mi0). Then, based on the Jeffreys
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(1961) scale, if the following condition holds
log mi1(y1:T |Mi1)− log mi0(y1:T |Mi0) > 1.15, (2.4.3)
then x is not able to price zi. In this case, we assert that zi is a genuine anomaly; otherwise zi is not
a genuine anomaly.
Applying the procedure described above, twenty genuine anomalies emerge, namely, acc, age,
currat, hire, lev, quick, salecash, sgr, Em, Lbp, dFin, Cop, Lfe, SA, sue, cash, OLAQ, CLAQ,
TBIQ, and BLQ. Details about these anomalies are given in Table 2.5.
2.4.2 The Potential Risk Factor Set
Now instead of conducting our model scan on the original twelve winners and these twenty genuine
anomalies, which leads to a model space of around four billion models (232−1 = 4,294,967,295),
we apply a second dimension reduction step by converting the genuine anomalies to principal
components (with the rotated mean added back in), of which we then consider the first eleven
that explain in total approximating 91% of the variation in the genuine anomalies, as can be seen
from Table 2.6. This set, of the twelve winners and the first eleven PCs of the genuine anomalies,
constitutes our potential risk factor set which we use to launch our extended risk factor analysis.
We note that this strategy of blending of winners and the PCs in this way appears to be new to
the literature. By this strategy, we are able to limit the model space to a reasonable dimension (of
around eight million models), while simultaneously avoiding the problem of working with twenty
correlated PCs that are also quite correlated with the winners. For instance, some anomalies are
related to leverage (currat, lev, quick, Lbp, and BLQ) and some are linked to sales status (salecash
and sgr). Considering two groups of risk factors in this way, where some are in their original form
and some are PCs, appears to be novel. It allows us to show the value of including anomalies as
potential risk factors.
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We also note that the idea of transforming our genuine anomalies into their corresponding
principal components is similar to Kozak, Nagel, and Santosh (2020) who argued that “a relatively
small set of principal component from the universe of potential characteristics-based factors can
approximate the SDF quite well.” Our idea is related, but distinct, as we keep the key factors (the
winners) as is, but only covert the less important (the genuine anomalies) into principal compo-
nents.
We emphasize again that our approach of reducing the 125 anomalies to the set of twenty
genuine anomalies is a dimension-reduction strategy. Furthermore, our idea of converting these
anomalies to the space of principal components, is another element of that same strategy. Of
course, whether as anomalies, or as PC’s, these factors are portfolios of assets. We believe that it is
meaningful and useful to retain the identity of the winners, thus allowing us to understand whether
the PC factors provide incremental information for pricing assets.
2.5 Winners Plus Genuine Anomalies Model Scan Results
2.5.1 Top Model Set
Starting with the potential risk factor set of dimension K̃ = 23, twelve winners plus eleven PCs,
and applying the methodology given in Section 2, we calculate the marginal likelihood of each of
the J̃ = 8,388,607 models in M̃ . Converting these marginal likelihoods into posterior model prob-
abilities, the ratios of these posterior model probabilities and the prior model probability (assumed
equal to 1/J̃ ) can be calculated. The ratio, Pr(ỹ1:T |M̃ j∗)
Pr(M̃ j∗)
, defined earlier in Section 3.2.1, makes it
easier to see which models receive more support from the data. We report these ratios for the top
220 models in Figure 2.4, in which the dashed blue vertical line represents the cutoff of the top
model set.
The top model set, denoted by M̃∗ as in Section 3.2.1, can be defined in relation to the best
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model M̃1∗. A model is in the top model set if its distance to the best model on the log marginal
likelihood scale is less than 1.15. These 29 models, along with the including associated risk factor
sets, log marginal likelihoods, and the ratios of posterior model probability and prior model prob-
ability are provided in Panel A of Table 2.7. The risk factors common to all these top models are
Mkt, MOM, ROE, PEAD, MGMT, PC1, PC4, and PC5. We also note that the risk factors that are
common to the top 3 models in the winners model scan, {Mkt, SMB, ROE, PEAD, MGMT}, are
also the risk factors that are common to the top 29 models in the extended model scan except that
SMB is replaced by MOM, which is also risk factors of the top 2 models of the winners scan.
Parameter Updating for the Best Model of the Winners Plus Genuine Model Scan
We now provide more details about the best model in the winners plus genuine model scan M̃1∗,
in which the risk factor set is given by x̃1∗,t = (Mkt,RMW,MOM, IA,ROE,MGMT,PEAD,FIN,
PC1,PC3,PC4,PC5,PC7)′t and the non risk factor set is given by w̃1∗,t = (SMB,HML,CMA,PERF,
PC2,PC6,PC8,PC9,PC10,PC11)′t :
M̃1∗ : x̃1∗,t = λ̃ x,1∗︸︷︷︸
13×1
+ε̃x,1∗, t , ε̃x,1∗, t ∼N13(0, Ω̃x,1∗),
w̃1∗,t = Γ̃1∗︸︷︷︸
10×10
x̃1∗,t + ε̃w·x,1∗, t , ε̃w·x,1∗, t ∼N10(0, Ω̃w·x,1∗).
Similar to Section 3.2, the prior and posterior statistics, i.e. prior mean, posterior mean, posterior
standard deviation, posterior median, 2.5% quantile, and 97.5% quantile for the risk premia λ̃ 1∗
are provided in Table 2.8.
2.5.2 Internal Consistency Condition
Just as in Section 3.3, we can see that 27 out of 29 models in the top model set M̃∗ satisfy the ICC
condition completely. The two exceptions occur for M16∗ which is unable to explain IA and M16∗
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which is unable to explain RMW. In constrast, models with the same risk factor sets as CAPM,
Fama and French family, HXZ, SY, and DHS deviate from ICC further, leaving out 13, 12, 10, 9,
5, 5, and 4 non-risk factors unexplained. Moreover, none of models with the same risk factor sets
as the top three models in the winners scan can explain PC1, PC2, and PC3.
2.5.3 Prediction
Similar to Section 3.4, it is important to consider how well the winning model performs out-of-
sample and we compute the predictive likelihood for a set of future observations ỹ(T +1):(T +12) =
( f̃ T +1, ..., f̃ T +12) denote 12 months of out-of-sample data on the winners and principal compo-
nents. Table 2.9 reports the log predictive likelihoods for top models in M̃∗ as well as models with
the same risk factor sets as CAPM, Fama and French family models, SY and DHS. We can tell that
those top models do not fail out of sample.
2.6 Economic Performance: Sharpe Ratios
Now suppose that based on the identity of the risk factors in (say) the best model M̃1∗ of the win-
ners plus genuine anomalies model scan, namely, Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD,
FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, and PC7, we construct an optimal mean-variance portfolio of these risk
factors together with a risk-free asset. Similarly, we construct the optimal mean-variance portfolios
from the risk factors in M̃1, M1 CAPM, Fama and French family, HXZ, SY, and DHS collections,
as well as the risk factors of top models of the winners model scan. This leads to the important
question: how do the Sharpe ratios of those different portfolios compare?
We construct these different portfolios in the following manner. Consider model M j with
associated risk factors x j. Given the data y1:T , consider calculating the predictive mean of x j,T +1
E[x j,T +1|M j,y1:T ] , x j,T +1|T =
∫
x j,T +1Nkx, j (x j,T +1|λ x, j,Ωx, j)π(θ j|M j,y1:T )dθ jdx j,T +1,
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which by changing the order of the integration can be seen to just equal the posterior mean of λ x, j
x j,T +1|T = λ̂ x, j ,
∫
Θ j
λ x, jπ(θ j|M j,y1:T )dθ j,
and the predictive covariance of x j,T +1
Ωx, j,T +1|T ,
∫
(x j,T +1−x j,T +1|T )(x j,T +1−x j,T +1|T )′Nkx, j (x j,T +1|λ x, j,Ωx, j)π(θ j|M j,y1:T )dθ jdx j,T +1,
which by the law of iterated expectations for covariances simplifies to the sum of the posterior
mean of Ωx, j and the posterior variance of λ x, j:
Ωx, j,T +1|T =
∫
Θ j
Ωx, jπ(θ j|M j,y1:T )dθ j +
∫
Θ j
(λ x, j− λ̂ x, j)(λ x, j− λ̂ x, j)′π(θ j|M j,y1:T )dθ j.
Of course, both these quantities are straightforwardly estimated from the output of the simulation
of the posterior density π(θ j|M j,y1:T ). Given these predictive moments, with certain calculations,












In Table 2.10 we report the Sharpe ratios of risk-factor portfolios based on several asset pricing
models. In Panel A we consider the risk factor sets of the top models in M̃∗, in Panel B for the
risk factor sets of the top models in M∗, and in Panel C for the M̃1, M1, CAPM, Fama and French
family, HXZ, SY, and DHS models.
Looking at the results in Panel B and C, we can see that the Sharpe ratios are much higher for
the top models from the winners scan than those from some of the existing asset pricing models.
Comparing the results in Panel A and Panel B, we see that the top models from the winners plus
genuine anomalies model scan provide even higher Sharpe ratios. Taken together, if we consider
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the best performing DHS model as the benchmark from Panel C, we can see that the models in M∗
have about 17% higher Sharpe ratios, and the models in M̃∗ have about 49% higher Sharpe ratios.
Finally, in the winners model scan, all twelve winners can achieve a Sharpe ratio of 0.56,
whereas investing in the seven winners of winners in M2∗ gives a Sharpe ratio of 0.55. And in
the winners plus genuine anomalies model scan, investing in those top risk factor sets produces a
Sharpe ratio as high as 0.70 while investing in all twelve winners plus eleven PCs gives 0.71. From
these close Sharpe ratios we can make two useful conclusions. First, the portfolios of risk factors
from the top models perform as well as those from the complete set of risk factors or; in other
words, there is some information redundancy in the potential risk factor set. Second, the marginal
likelihood ranking and the Sharpe ratio ranking of models are aligned.
2.7 Conclusion
Our paper makes a contribution to the literature on Bayesian risk factor selection. Starting from the
twelve distinct risk factors in Fama and French (1993, 2015, 2018), Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015),
Stambaugh and Yuan (2017), and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Sun (2020), we construct and compare
4,095 asset pricing models and find that the top models with the highest posterior model prob-
abilities have six risk factors, superior out-of-sample predictive performance, and higher Sharpe
ratios. We show also that both fundamental and behavioral risk factors appear in our top model
set, highlighting the importance of behavioral factors in pricing and investment decision making.
We also consider if we can get an improved set of risk factors by formulating models that in-
volve the set of winners and additional factors based on the genuine anomalies, i.e., anomalies
that cannot be explained by the winners. The framework we have developed, in which we re-
duce the 125 anomalies to the set of twenty genuine anomalies before converting these genuine
anomalies to the space of principal components, allows us to understand whether the PC factors
provide incremental information for pricing assets. An extensive comparison of 8,388,607 asset
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pricing models, constructed from the twelve winners plus eleven principal components of genuine
anomalies, shows that there is much to gain by incorporating information in the genuine anomalies.
For example, the Sharp ratios increase by more than 30%. Nonetheless, the risk factors from the
winners set are the key risk factors, even though some prove to be redundant.
The general approach that we describe in this paper has wide applications. The idea of combin-
ing well vetted factors (the winners) with the PCs of less established factors in a model comparison
setup, is likely to prove extremely useful beyond this problem to other asset categories such as
bonds, currencies and commodities, and is likely to open up many interesting avenues for further
research.
56
Table 2.1: Winners Definitions
Factors Definitions
Mkt the excess return of the market portfolio
SMB the return spread between diversified portfolios of small size and big size stocks
HML the return spread between diversified portfolios of high and low B/M stocks
RMW the return spread between diversified portfolios of stocks with robust and weak profitability
CMA the return spread between diversified portfolios of the stocks of low (conservative) and high (aggressive) investment firms
MOM the momentum factor based on two prior returns
IA the investment factor based on annual changes in total assets divided by lagged total assets
ROE the profitability factor based on income before extraordinary items divided by one-quarter-lagged book equity
MGMT the mispricing factor controlled by management
PERF the mispricing factor related to performance
PEAD the short-horizon behavioral factor motivated by investor inattention and evidence of short-horizon under reaction
FIN the long-horizon behavioral factor exploiting the information in managers’ decisions to issue or repurchase equity
Figure 2.1: Top 220 Models of the Winners Model Scan
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Figure 2.2: Top 5 Models of the Winners Model Scan
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Table 2.2: Marginal Likelihoods and the Ratios of Posterior Model Probability and Prior
Model Probability of Selected Models in the Winners Model Space M
Results from the comparison of the J̃ = 4,095 models. Panel A has the results for the top three
models, and Panel B for M̃1 and models with the same risk factor sets as CAPM, FF3, FF5, FF6,
HXZ, SY, and DHS.
Risk factors logm j(y1:T |M j)
Pr(M j |y1:T )
Pr(M j)
Panel A: Top three models
Mkt, SMB, MOM, ROE, MGMT, PEAD 14186.43 527.89
Mkt, SMB, MOM, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD 14186.28 454.09
Mkt, SMB, ROE, MGMT, PEAD 14186.18 413.01
Panel B: M̃1 and models with the same risk factor sets as CAPM, FF3, FF5, FF6, HXZ, SY, and DHS
12 winners 1.66×10−1
Mkt 14140.85 8.44×10−18
Mkt, SMB, HML 14140.32 4.98×10−18
Mkt, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA 14152.79 1.30×10−12
Mkt, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA, MOM 14154.45 6.87×10−12
Mkt, SMB, IA, ROE 14164.47 1.54×10−7
Mkt, SMB, MGMT, PERF 14173.32 1.07×10−3
Mkt, PEAD, FIN 14178.86 2.73×10−1
Table 2.3: Prior and Posterior Statistics of the Risk Premia Parameters of the Best of the
Winners Model Scan M1∗
Prior and posterior statistics, i.e. prior mean, posterior mean, posterior standard deviation, posterior
median, 2.5% quantile, and 97.5% quantile for the risk premia λ x,1∗ of the best model M∗1, which
has Mkt, SMB, MOM, ROE, MGMT, and PEAD as risk factors.
Prior mean Posterior mean Posterior sd Posterior median 2.5% Quantile 97.5% Quantile
Mkt 0.0017 0.0066 0.0020 0.0066 0.0026 0.0106
SMB 0.0130 0.0016 0.0013 0.0016 -0.0010 0.0043
MOM 0.0044 0.0061 0.0021 0.0061 0.0020 0.0101
ROE 0.0041 0.0058 0.0012 0.0058 0.0034 0.0081
MGMT 0.0084 0.0056 0.0013 0.0056 0.0030 0.0082
PEAD 0.0085 0.0056 0.0009 0.0056 0.0039 0.0074
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Figure 2.3: Posterior Distributions of the Risk Premia Parameters of the Best of the Winners
Model Scan M1∗
Table 2.4: Predictive Likelihoods for the Winners Model Scan
Predictive likelihoods of selected asset pricing models in winners model scan.
Risk factors logm j(y(T+1):(T+12)|M j)
Panel A: Top three models
Mkt, SMB, MOM, ROE, MGMT, PEAD 383.48
Mkt, SMB, MOM, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD 383.65
Mkt, SMB, ROE, MGMT, PEAD 383.55
Panel B: Models with the same risk factor sets as CAPM, FF3, FF5, FF6, HXZ, SY, and DHS
Mkt 382.46
Mkt, SMB, HML 381.76
Mkt, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA 381.67
Mkt, SMB, HML, CMA, RMW, MOM 381.83
Mkt, SMB, IA, ROE 381.87
Mkt, SMB, MGMT, PERF 382.89
Mkt, FIN, PEAD 382.76
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Table 2.5: Surviving Anomalies Explanations
Anomalies Explanations
acc annual income before extraordinary items minus operating cash flows divided by average total assets
age number of years since first Compustat coverage
currat current assets / current liabilities
hire percent change in number of employees
lev total liabilities divided by fiscal year-end market capitalization
quick (current assets - inventory) / current liabilities
salecash annual sales divided by cash and cash equivalents
sgr annual percent change in sales (sale)
Em enterprise value divided by operating income before depreciation (Compustat annual item OIBDP)
Lbp leverage component of book to price
dFin the change in net financial assets
Cop cash-based operating profitability
Lfe labor force efficiency
SA SA index measuring financial constraint
sue the high-minus-low earnings surprise
cash cash and cash equivalents divided by average total assets
OLAQ quarterly operating profits-to-lagged assets
CLAQ quarterly cash-based operating profits-to-lagged assets
TBIQ quarterly taxable income-to-book income
BLQ quarterly book leverage
Table 2.6: Importance of Principal Components
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5
Standard deviation 0.1143 0.0785 0.0441 0.0415 0.0408
Proportion of Variance 0.3953 0.1866 0.0590 0.0521 0.0503
Cumulative Proportion 0.3953 0.5819 0.6409 0.6930 0.7433
PC6 PC7 PC8 PC9 PC10
Standard deviation 0.0366 0.0331 0.0298 0.0282 0.0274
Proportion of Variance 0.0405 0.0332 0.0269 0.0241 0.0227
Cumulative Proportion 0.7837 0.8170 0.8438 0.8680 0.8907
PC11 PC12 PC13 PC14 PC15
Standard deviation 0.0257 0.0231 0.0218 0.0201 0.0194
Proportion of Variance 0.0200 0.0162 0.0144 0.0122 0.0113
Cumulative Proportion 0.9106 0.9268 0.9412 0.9535 0.9648
PC16 PC17 PC18 PC19 PC20
Standard deviation 0.0172 0.0162 0.0158 0.0142 0.0125
Proportion of Variance 0.0090 0.0079 0.0075 0.0061 0.0047
Cumulative Proportion 0.9737 0.9817 0.9892 0.9953 1.0000
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Figure 2.4: Top 220 Models of the Winners Plus Genuine Anomalies Model Scan
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Table 2.7: Marginal Likelihoods and Ratios of Posterior Model Probability and Prior Model
Probability of Selected Models in the Winners Plus Genuine Anomalies Model Space M̃
Risk Factors logm j(ỹ1:T |M̃ j)
Pr(ỹ1:T |M̃ j)
Pr(M̃ j)
Panel A: Top models in M̃∗
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 24621.85 57939.28
Mkt, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC4, PC5, PC7 24621.72 50803.12
Mkt, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 24621.68 48969.29
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5 24621.51 41429.51
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 24621.48 40171.69
Mkt, RMW, CMA, MOM, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 24621.44 38720.10
Mkt, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC4, PC5 24621.43 38145.58
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5 24621.21 30594.32
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, PC1, PC4, PC5 24621.16 29262.14
Mkt, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC4, PC5, PC7, PC9 24621.15 28892.28
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, PC1, PC4, PC5, PC7 24621.14 28496.78
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC4, PC5, PC7 24621.11 27648.27
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC4, PC5 24621.10 27321.30
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 24621.09 27292.03
Mkt, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5 24621.08 26966.60
Mkt, MOM, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 24621.07 26499.81
Mkt, RMW, CMA, MOM, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5 24621.02 25260.55
Mkt, MOM, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 24620.99 24590.60
Mkt, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 24620.90 22526.00
Mkt, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7, PC9 24620.86 21524.20
Mkt, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC4, PC5, PC9 24620.84 21061.93
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC4, PC5, PC7 24620.81 20467.26
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, PC1, PC4, PC5, PC7 24620.78 19969.41
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7, PC9 24620.77 19636.23
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, PC1, PC4, PC5 24620.73 18874.75
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC4, PC5 24620.71 18612.73
Mkt, CMA, MOM, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 24620.71 18597.04
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 24620.71 18577.15
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5 24620.71 18531.14
Panel B: M̃1 and models with the same risk factor sets as CAPM, FF3, FF5, FF6, HXZ, SY, and DHS
12 winners and 11 PCs 24606.63 1.71×10−9
Mkt 24560.93 2.42×10−29
Mkt, SMB, HML 24560.17 1.13×10−29
Mkt, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA 24572.01 1.57×10−24
Mkt, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA, MOM 24573.47 6.74×10−24
Mkt, SMB, IA, ROE 24583.58 1.66×10−19
Mkt, SMB, MGMT, PERF 24592.21 9.25×10−16
Mkt, PEAD, FIN 24597.68 2.20×10−13
Panel C: Models with the same risk factor sets as the top three models in the winners model scan
Mkt, SMB, MOM, ROE, MGMT, PEAD 24604.69 2.44×10−10
Mkt, SMB, MOM, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD 24604.41 1.84×10−10
Mkt, SMB, ROE, MGMT, PEAD 24604.60 2.22×10−10
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Table 2.8: Prior and Posterior Statistics of the Risk Premia Parameters of the Best of the
Winners Plus Genuine Model Scan M̃1∗
Prior and posterior statistics, i.e. prior mean, posterior mean, posterior standard deviation, posterior
median, 2.5% quantile, and 97.5% quantile for the risk premia λ̃ x,1∗ of the best model M∗1, which
has Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, and PC7 as risk
factors.
Prior mean Posterior mean Posterior sd Posterior median 2.5% Quantile 97.5% Quantile
Mkt 0.0017 0.0066 0.0021 0.0066 0.0025 0.0106
RMW -0.0015 0.0036 0.0011 0.0036 0.0014 0.0057
MOM 0.0044 0.0061 0.0021 0.0061 0.0020 0.0102
IA 0.0075 0.0033 0.0009 0.0033 0.0016 0.0050
ROE 0.0041 0.0058 0.0012 0.0058 0.0034 0.0081
MGMT 0.0084 0.0056 0.0013 0.0056 0.0030 0.0082
PEAD 0.0085 0.0056 0.0009 0.0056 0.0039 0.0074
FIN 0.0077 0.0070 0.0018 0.0070 0.0034 0.0106
PC1 0.0044 -0.0006 0.0056 -0.0006 -0.0117 0.0103
PC3 0.0191 0.0082 0.0020 0.0082 0.0043 0.0121
PC4 0.0221 0.0112 0.0018 0.0112 0.0076 0.0147
PC5 0.0009 0.0013 0.0019 0.0013 -0.0024 0.0051
PC7 -0.0005 -0.0011 0.0015 -0.0011 -0.0040 0.0018
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Table 2.9: Predictive Likelihoods for the Winners Plus Genuine Anomalies Model Scan
Predictive likelihoods of selected models in the winners plus genuine anomalies model scan.
Risk factors logm j(ỹ(T+1):(T+12)|M̃ j)
Panel A: Top models in M̃∗
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 639.27
Mkt, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC4, PC5, PC7 639.36
Mkt, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 639.46
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5 639.01
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 639.86
Mkt, RMW, CMA, MOM, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 639.09
Mkt, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC4, PC5 639.08
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5 639.59
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, PC1, PC4, PC5 639.36
Mkt, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC4, PC5, PC7, PC9 639.32
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, PC1, PC4, PC5, PC7 639.65
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC4, PC5, PC7 639.16
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC4, PC5 638.86
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 639.35
Mkt, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5 639.23
Mkt, MOM, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 639.53
Mkt, RMW, CMA, MOM, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5 638.82
Mkt, MOM, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 639.48
Mkt, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 639.41
Mkt, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7, PC9 639.43
Mkt, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC4, PC5, PC9 639.08
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC4, PC5, PC7 639.25
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, PC1, PC4, PC5, PC7 639.71
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7, PC9 639.19
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, PC1, PC4, PC5 639.42
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC4, PC5 638.95
Mkt, CMA, MOM, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 639.26
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 639.90
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5 639.09
Panel B: M̃1 and models with risk factor sets same as CAPM, FF3, FF5, FF6, HXZ, SY, and DHS
12 winners and 11 PCs 638.61
Mkt 640.03
Mkt, SMB, HML 639.35
Mkt, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA 639.27
Mkt, SMB, HML, CMA, RMW, MOM 639.43
Mkt, SMB, IA, ROE 639.48
Mkt, SMB, MGMT, PERF 640.48
Mkt, FIN, PEAD 640.35
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Table 2.10: Sharpe Ratios
Sharpe ratios for the risk factor sets of selected asset pricing models based on G = 100,000.
Risk factors Sharpe ratios
Panel A: Risk factor sets of the top models in M̃∗
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 0.69
Mkt, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC4, PC5, PC7 0.68
Mkt, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 0.69
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5 0.68
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 0.68
Mkt, RMW, CMA, MOM, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 0.69
Mkt, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC4, PC5 0.67
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5 0.67
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, PC1, PC4, PC5 0.66
Mkt, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC4, PC5, PC7, PC9 0.69
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, PC1, PC4, PC5, PC7 0.67
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC4, PC5, PC7 0.68
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC4, PC5 0.67
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 0.70
Mkt, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5 0.68
Mkt, MOM, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 0.68
Mkt, RMW, CMA, MOM, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5 0.68
Mkt, MOM, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 0.67
Mkt, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 0.68
Mkt, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7, PC9 0.70
Mkt, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC4, PC5, PC9 0.68
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC4, PC5, PC7 0.69
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, PC1, PC4, PC5, PC7 0.68
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7, PC9 0.70
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, PC1, PC4, PC5 0.67
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC4, PC5 0.68
Mkt, CMA, MOM, ROE, MGMT, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 0.68
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5, PC7 0.68
Mkt, RMW, MOM, IA, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD, FIN, PC1, PC3, PC4, PC5 0.69
Panel B: Risk factor sets of the top three models in the winners model scan
Mkt, SMB, MOM, ROE, MGMT, PEAD 0.54
Mkt, SMB, MOM, ROE, MGMT, PERF, PEAD 0.55
Mkt, SMB, ROE, MGMT, PEAD 0.53
Panel C: Risk factor sets of M̃1, M1, CAPM, FF3, FF5, FF6, HXZ, SY, and DHS models
12 winners and 11 PCs 0.71
12 winners 0.56
Mkt 0.15
Mkt, SMB, HML 0.20
Mkt, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA 0.34
Mkt, SMB, HML, CMA, RMW, MOM 0.36
Mkt, SMB, IA, ROE 0.40
Mkt, SMB, MGMT, PERF 0.45
Mkt, FIN, PEAD 0.47
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In this appendix, we describe how the 33 DGPs for generating the simulated data in the eight-factor
experiment were selected (the same process is used in the twelve-factor case, and thus for brevity
the details of that case are suppressed). Supposes that
xt = (Mkt, f t)
′
consists of {Mkt,SMB,ROE, IA}. Then the DGP is given by











































































+ ε∗t , ε
∗
t ∼N (0, Σ∗︸︷︷︸
4×4
). (A3)
To generate data from the DGP, we have to fix the parameters at some suitable values. A sensible
choice is to fix the parameters at the maximum likelihood (ML) values to ensure that the generated
data resemble the real data. A key point is that we should ensure that the generating DGP is a
valid model for the purpose of generating our data. By “valid model” we mean a model in which
the fitted stochastic discount factor (SDF) suggests that each assumed risk factor is statistically
significant. In other words, if we let the SDF be given by
Mt = 1−λ ′xΩ−1x (xt−µx),
the fitted values of b′ = λ ′xΩ
−1
x should each be significant. Otherwise, the maintained assumption
that the factors {Mkt,SMB,ROE, IA} are the risk factors would be counter to the evidence and
the data generated from such a DGP would lead to misleading model comparisons. To isolate
the models that we can use to generate the data, we find the ML estimates of b for each of the
128 models from monthly data on the aforementioned risk factors that run from January 1968
to December 2015 with 576 observations in total.6 We select these DGPs by fitting each of the
128 possible models to the actual data by ML and then checking whether any component of the
vector b′ = λ ′xΩ
−1
x is insignificant. If any component is insignificant, the collection of factors
xt = (Mkt, f t)
′ in that model are not used as a DGP in the simulation exercise.
For each of the 128 possible models, the ML estimates of the parameters and of b are obtained
6The Mkt, SMB, HML, RMW, and CMA factors are from Kenneth French’s website.We thank the authors for
making the data available. We also thank Lu Zhang for providing us the ME, ROE, and IA factors.
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as follows. Given a particular xt = (Mkt, f t)
′ and under the pricing restrictions, any one of candidate
factor models takes the form
xt = Ωxb + ηx,t (A4)
f ∗t = β











Using the data from January 1968 to December 2015, we find the estimate of b by maximizing the
log-likelihood function of the model implied by (A4) to (A6) and calculate the variance-covariance
matrix of the estimate as the negative inverse of the Hessian matrix of the likelihood function at
the ML estimate. A model is used to generate data in our simulation experiments if each element
in b is significant at the 5% level.
Appendix B
In this appendix we give the proof of the Jacobian term used in Proposition 3.


























Partition β 1 and σ1,
β 1 =
 β f1 : (L j−1)×1
β
f∗



































































































































































































































































































































































































































∣∣∣∣det(∂σ f f∗1∂β ∗′j, f
)∣∣∣∣
=





= |Σ j⊗ IK−L j |
= |Σ j|K−L j .
Appendix C
In this appendix we provide detail for calculation of CZZ Marginal Likelihoods: General Case.
We calculate marginal likelihood using the basic marginal likelihood identity in Chib (1995): for






where the numerator is just the product of the sampling density (likelihood function) and the prior
density of parameters, with all integrating constants included, and the denominator is the posterior
density of θ .





















and after taking transpose and vec we get
y = (X⊗ Id)β + e, e∼N (0, IT ⊗Σ),
where
y = vec(Y ′) and β = vec(B).
Throughout this appendix, the hat denote the least squares estimators of parameters. The least
squares estimator of B′ is given by












β ∼N (β 0,D−10 ),
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where D0 is precision matrix. Applying Bayes update
β |y,Σ∼N (β 1,D−11 ),
where









In model M j, j = 2,3, ..., J̃, let f̃ j denote the risk factors with dimension L j× 1 and let f ∗j
denote the non-risk factors with dimension (K−L j)×1. The model is given by





f ∗j,t = B
∗



















where β ∗j, f = vec(B
∗




j). Under the collection of priors in
Proposition 4, with the value of c set equal to 1, and α̃ j|M j ∼ NL j (α̃ j0,k jΣ j), the marginal
likelihood of model M j, j = 2,3, ..., J̃, on the log-scale is given by
log m̃(ynt+1:T |M j) = log m̃( f̃ j,nt+1:T |M j) + log m̃( f
∗
j,nt+1:T |M j). (C10)
To calculate the marginal likelihood on the log-scale for the top model, we apply the equation (C7)
on the log-scale
log m̃( f̃ j,nt+1:T |M j) = log p( f̃ j,nt+1:T |M j, α̃ j,Σ j)
+ log π(α̃ j|M j,Σ j) + log ψ̃(Σ j|M j)
− log π(α̃ j|M j,Σ j, f̃ j,nt+1:T )− log π(Σ j|M j, f̃ j,nt+1:T ),
(C11)
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where the first three terms are sampling density and the prior density of parameters:




NL j ( f̃ j,t |α̃ j,Σ j) (C12)
π(α̃ j|M j,Σ j) = NL j (α̃ j|α̃ j0,k jΣ j) (C13)
ψ̃(Σ j|M j) = |Σ j|−
2L j−K+1
2 . (C14)
The fourth term can be obtained by applying the results of multivariate normal regression for
t = nt + 1, . . . ,T , thus






T̃ k j + 1
α̃ j0 +
T̃ k j
T̃ k j + 1
ˆ̃α j and D j1 = (
1
k j
+ T̃ )Σ−1j . (C16)
To obtain the fifth term, we calculate
p( f̃ j,nt+1:T |M j,Σ j)
=
∫
p( f̃ j,nt+1:T |M j, α̃ j,Σ j)π(α̃ j|M j,Σ j)dα̃ j
=
∫
p( f̃ j,nt+1:T |M j,a j,Σ j)π(a j|M j,Σ j)da j,
where a j = α̃ j− α̃ j0 and π(a j|M j,Σ j) = NL j (a j|0,k jΣ j). Thus











2 (a j−â j)
′(T̃ Σ−1j )(a j−â j)(2π)−
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′((k−1j +T)Σ
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where the integral is equal to one and




















( f̃ j,t− ˆ̃α j)′( f̃ j,t− ˆ̃α j) +
T̃
T̃ k j + 1
( ˆ̃α j− α̃ j0)′( ˆ̃α j− α̃ j0).
Combining with ψ̃(Σ j|M j), we achieve








which follows an inverse Wishart distribution with degree of freedom ν = T̃ +L j−K and the scale
matrix is Ψ j. So the fifth term is given by
π(Σ j|M j, f̃ j,nt+1:T ) = I W L j (Σ j|Ψ j,ν). (C17)
Plugging equations (I.6) - (I.11) back into equation (I.5), after cancellation, we get
log m̃( f̃ j,nt+1:T |M j) =log(2π)
−
T̃ L j
2 + log |T̃ k j + 1|
T̃
2 − log |Ψ j|
ν
2 + log 2
νL j














log(T̃ k j + 1)
−
(
T̃ + L j−K
)
2
log |Ψ j|+ log ΓL j
(




To calculate the marginal likelihood on the log-scale for the bottom model, we apply the equa-
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tion (C7) on the log-scale







+ log π(β ∗j, f |M j,Σ∗j) + log ψ̃(Σ∗j |M j)
− log π(β ∗j, f |M j,Σ∗j , f ∗j,nt+1:T )− log π(Σ
∗
j |M j, f ∗j,nt+1:T ),
(C18)
where the first three terms are sampling density and the prior density of parameters:








NL j ( f
∗
j,t |B∗j, f f̃ j,t ,Σ∗j) (C19)
π(β ∗j, f |M j,Σ∗j) = 1 (C20)
ψ̃(Σ∗j |M j) = |Σ∗j |−
−K+1
2 . (C21)
The fourth term can be obtained by applying the results of multivariate normal regression for
t = nt + 1, . . . ,T , thus



















To obtain the fifth term, we calculate
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( f ∗j,t− B̂
∗
j, f f̃ j,t)Σ
∗−1( f ∗j,t− B̂
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j, f f̃ j,t)
′.
Combining with ψ̃(Σ j|M j), we achieve










which follows an inverse Wishart distribution with degree of freedom ν∗ = T̃ and the scale matrix
is Ψ∗j . So the fifth term is given by
π(Σ∗j |M j, f ∗j,nt+1:T ) = I W K−L j (Σ̂
∗
j |Ψ∗j ,ν∗). (C24)












log |W ∗j |−
T̃
2
log |Ψ∗j |+ log ΓK−L j
(
T̃
2
)
.
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